

**TIKAPATTHANA OF THE ABHIDHAMMA  
PITAKA: PART 1.  
PACCAYAVIBHANGAVARA;  
TOGETHER WITH BUDDHAGHOSA'S  
COMMENTARY FROM THE  
PANCAPPAKARANATTHAKATHA**

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Tikapathana of the Abhidhamma pitaka: Part 1. Paccayavibhangavara; together with  
Buddhaghosa's commentary from the Pancappakaranatthakatha by Mrs. Rhys Davids

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**MRS. RHYS DAVIDS**

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# TIKAPAṬṬHĀNA

OF THE ABHIDHAMMA PIṬAKA

PART I.

PACCAYAVIBHANGAVĀRA

TOGETHER WITH

BUDDHAGHOSA'S COMMENTARY  
FROM THE PAÑCAPPAKARAṆATTHAKATHĀ

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## EDITOR'S FOREWORD.

AFTER a delay of five years a commencement is herewith made of an edition of the first part of the seventh and last work in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka—the Paṭṭhāna or Mahā-pakarana or 'Great Book.' It may be remembered that by an oversight of ignorance the second part, or Duka-paṭṭhāna, was published first, fifteen years ago. The cause of this oversight is stated in my Preface to our edition of that work. It was due to a not unreasonable assumption of learned cataloguers that two comes before three (*duka, tika*). In those days we knew even less of Abhidhamma than we do now, or a clue would have been afforded by the Dhammasaṅgani-Matika. There, at a glimpse, in the P.T.S. edition, at Dr. Edward Müller's table of contents, it will be seen that 'Tikaṇ' holds the prior position, the rest of the work being an analysis of concepts considered as 'Duka's.'

The obvious course, in view of this dislocated order of publication, was to make good without loss of time. But so steady has been the influx of first editions (and important reprints) by other contributors that, unless we had postponed the edition of the Yamaka—the immediately preceding book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka—no opportunity has presented itself till now. Nothing was known of the Yamaka; a good slice of the Paṭṭhāna was known. And so the Tikapaṭṭhāna had to bide its time some years longer.

Even now we publish only a quite exiguous amount of the text. But the corresponding portion of the Commentary has been in type for five years awaiting publication. And

other considerations decided us to issue just this little dual instalment. Inflated cost of production and a stationary rate of subscription are limiting our rate of output—thus, we could not well afford a less slender volume. Moreover, this text needs its Commentary more than most others. And the portion of each that we publish is introductory; beyond there stretches the long section of the first Tika—the Kusalattikaṅ—that is, the consideration of experience as moral, immoral, and unmoral in connection with these twenty-four modes of relation (*paccaya*) existing between phenomena. To have included this Tika would have multiplied the bulk of the volume very considerably. It could not be done.

I hope, before resigning all further editorial labours, to follow up this little First Part with one larger and final volume, in which the Kusala-ttika (and its Commentary) will be set out with sufficient fulness to show as a sample of the scheme of the whole work, and then the remaining Tikas will be indicated in some more or less condensed form. Such was the plan I set myself in the Preface to the Dukapaṭṭhāna. I have yet to be convinced that it will serve any useful purpose whatever for the present and following generation—to predict no further—to set out in complete detail these pathetic preoccupations of an age of early schoolmen, prevented by their hedged-in lives, by the lack of written books, by their limited locomotion, from developing any constructive ability, any widening of their outlook on facts, past, present, or to come. Their missionary brethren of the Order were active and a-field, and were learning much. Not so these Ābhidhammikas. It is true that Buddhaghosa, in his discussion of the Patiecasamuppādo (*Visuddhi-Magga*, pp. 532 ff.), tries to utilize the twenty-four causal relations to push home his analyses. But here we have an author with a literary tradition of some centuries informing mind and pen, or stylus. We have not the stiffly compiled mnemonics of canonical Ābhidhamma. His application of the *paccaya*'s to a given



subject will probably prove more instructive to the student than any detailed consideration of the *Tikapattthāna* itself.

Meanwhile, the circumscribed portion of that work here published is well worth the study of the historian of Buddhist ideas, and of logical and philosophical ideas in general. It is the one notable constructive contribution to knowledge in the *Abhidhamma*. Even at the present day our logicians and philosophers are not in agreement as to how to define relation between things or qualities, much less as to admitting any definite maximum in the number of such relations. We read on one page of such abstractions as cause, resemblance, succession; on another of such relatively complex concrete relations as 'paternity.' Admitting such as the latter, a numerical limit becomes impracticable. The early Buddhist schoolmen decided to limit themselves to twenty-four, and, either to lend supreme authority to this decision or to foster an old tradition, ascribed the list to their founder. But they were, from a more modern point of view, too childlike in such matters to explain just why these twenty-four—so many and no more—were chosen. And, so far as I have been able to gather, their descendants have never adequately done so either.

A lucid and otherwise admirable disquisition on the Buddhist philosophy of relations by Mahāthera Ledi Sayadaw of Mandalay was published in the *JOURNAL* for 1915-16. This should be consulted without fail by all who seek to understand this *Paccaya-naya* in general and in particular. It is the best thing on the subject that has been published by an Asiatic Buddhist, and it will only be surpassed, in the case of any similarly bred writer, by one who has so far acquainted himself with the latest European research, that he can detach himself from the uncritical standpoint of his tradition, and treat the subject critically and comparatively.

The Mahāthera (who is known to be no mere follower of tradition) judges that the twenty-four *paccaya*'s, or modes

of relation between things (*dharmā*), are so many *paṭṭhāna*'s. And by this he means chief or pre-eminent aspects of the causal relation (*op. cit.*, p. 26: *pa-tṭhanay*). Buddhaghosa, that is, the commentarial tradition, offered three alternative, optional meanings (below, pp. 9 f.):—*Paṭṭhāna* means either *paccaya*, or something analyzed (*pa-tṭhapana*, *vibhajana*), or an established procedure (*paṭṭhita*, *gamana*). Hence, even in his day the word was elastic, multi-significant.<sup>1</sup> And he gives no measure for confining the number of *paṭṭhānas* to twenty-four—not even the rough test of pre-eminence.

The Mahāthera goes on to subsume *paṭṭhāna* under *paccaya*, as a special kind of *paccaya*, applicable only to a relation that is, so to speak, immediate or direct, not to effects which are the outcome of such a relation. How far this is again an original point of view I cannot say. I do not find it in the Commentary. But I do find therein nothing to veto our considering the term *paṭṭhāna* as covering a special analytical study of *paccaya*. Namely, one thing, in happening as conditioned by (*paccayā*) another thing, manifests itself as being in certain ways related to, or correlated with that other thing. The principle of causation, or conditionedness, is in the Buddhist scriptures enunciated often and with manifold emphasis in the doctrine called *Paṭicca-samuppāda*, or causal genesis, but chiefly in the *Nidāna-Samyutta*, a translation of which we are issuing next year. But the resolution of this conditionedness into a number of relations, where causality is for the most part not obvious, is dealt with not at all in the four *Nikāyas*, but in the later analyses summed up as *Abhidhamma*, and only in the last book of that.

The twenty-four, then, are not met with in *Vinaya* or *Suttanta*, and are relegated to one book only—except for a few partial references in the *Kathavatthu*—to the last corner of *Abhidhamma*. Nevertheless, the twenty-four, as

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Jat.* i., 78 (*Nidāna*).

stated in the 'Great Book' so placed, and as applied with immense patience and sagacity of psychological analysis to a number of ethical concepts, have profoundly impressed the Buddhist scholastic mind, from Buddhaghosa's age to the present day. The English reader can now refer to Maung Tin's translation of Buddhaghosa's first Abhidhamma Commentary: the *Expositor* (p. 17), and read how it was only when he reached the 'Great Book' that the Buddha's omniscience found its full opportunity, and in the exposition of which the full glory of his rays shone forth. And the Burmese Mahāthera, in concise and simple language, testifies in his turn to its importance.

It is not at first sight obvious why the long, dreary, unreadable analyses of the twenty-four relations as aspects of concrete states of mind should rank as such a crown to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, or as such a supreme opportunity to the Teacher. I figure it on this wise.

We know that in setting forth a doctrine of change (*anicca*) and of non-Ātmanism—which is a special aspect of change—the doctrine of natural causation necessarily took first rank in Gotama's philosophy of life. It became necessary (to avoid mental anarchy) to show that phenomena, however they were started, proceeded, in changing, according to a natural order of cause and effect, and not 'anyhow'.<sup>1</sup> But his actual teaching—as differing in emphasis from his philosophical basis—concentrated itself on the attainment of happiness for men by men. (He called it the cessation of unhappiness.) And he so teaching, the exposition of his law of natural causation—'this being, that comes to be . . . this ceasing, that ceases,' etc.

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps we are all a little wiser now about Buddhist philosophy, yet I have seen that philosophy seriously condemned because, for it, the course of ever-changing phenomena was quite fortuitous! I forget the book's title, and it is better forgotten. The history of science, it has been well said, gives us 'a definite impression of the persistent progressive way in which man has learned to say, "If this, then that," which is half of science' (J. A. Thomson, *New Statesman*, January 1, 1921). But Gotama taught it him first.