

**DYNAMIC IDEALISM; AN
ELEMENTARY COURSE IN
THE METAPHYSICS OF
PSYCHOLOGY**

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Dynamic idealism; an elementary course in the metaphysics of psychology by Alfred H. Lloyd

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ALFRED H. LLOYD

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DYNAMIC IDEALISM

Relationship among things is the criterion neither of a life nor of a mind that exists apart from the substance of the universe. It is, however, the criterion of substance itself, and as the central truth about things it bears this witness: *The universe itself lives; the universe itself thinks.*

DYNAMIC IDEALISM

AN ELEMENTARY COURSE
IN THE
METAPHYSICS OF PSYCHOLOGY

*FIRST ENTERED UPON IN LECTURES BEFORE
STUDENTS IN PHILOSOPHY AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN*

BY

ALFRED H. LLOYD, Ph.D.

AUTHOR OF "CITIZENSHIP AND SALVATION"



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PREFACE.

THE following chapters, as has been indicated on the titlepage, are made up from material used in a university lecture-room, but the impulse to put the substance of the lectures into the form of a book really came from another source. A year ago I gave six lectures upon subjects from psychology, before the Twentieth Century Club of Detroit; and the certain difficulties as well as the apparent successes that I met with in those lectures led me into the writing of this book.

Accordingly, throughout the ensuing pages I have had in mind, as my possible readers, those who are not strictly technical students in psychology, and on their account I have tried to avoid the more serious technicalities. The subject, however, is a deep one, and it deepens as it goes. So let me confess here that, while always courting both brevity and simplicity and often using extremely popular and large-written illustrations, I have not always refrained from

saying, as occasion has offered, even what has seemed likely to be of interest only to psychological specialists.

My standpoint is also indicated on the title-page, at least in part. Not only am I heartily in sympathy with such thinkers to-day as insist that psychology without metaphysics is useless, if not absurd, but also I go to the extent of believing that real psychology is metaphysics. I have, therefore, whenever considering a psychological theory, been more interested in its relation to Dualism or to Monism — that is to say, in its metaphysical implications — than in any of its mere external details. For example, the physiological or the paidological statement of any fact or process, or the abstract statement from any other field of inquiry, has always seemed to me to be subordinate to the metaphysical principle. Only the metaphysical principle can make any fact or any process really concrete.

And, finally, in special illustration of my predilection for metaphysics, I may say that I have felt that the first duty of psychology was to give a distinct, explicit doctrine of the soul. Psychology must not and cannot tarry any longer at either the body or the mind alone, nor even at both together. "Science of the soul," the

old-fashioned definition, which has been scorned or discreetly neglected by modern rationalism, is, after all, the true definition. Perhaps, however, the scorn has meant only the passing of a certain idea of the soul; and in recognition of such a possibility I have usually employed the more general term, "self," for the soul-reality. Surely there is a soul-reality, whether there be a "soul" or not.

A. H. L.

ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN,
November, 1897.

