

**DEMOSTHENES; ORATIONS
AGAINST PHILIP, WITH
INTRODUCTION AND NOTES. VOL.
II. PART I. - INTRODUCTION AND
TEXT. VOL. II. PART II.- NOTES**

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DEMOSTHENES

ORATIONS AGAINST PHILIP

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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VOL. II. PART I.—INTRODUCTION AND TEXT

(On the Peace. Philippic II. On the Chersonese. Philippic III)

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INTRODUCTION.

The Peace of Philocrates, 346-340 B.C.

FROM 357 B.C. the Athenians had been at war with Philip I for the recovery of Amphipolis. A large sum of money had been spent (Æschines mentions 1500 talents, about £330,000), and yet the war had been nothing but a catalogue of losses. Pydna, Potidaea, Methone had followed Amphipolis; Euboea had broken loose from Athens; the larger islands of the new confederation, Corcyra, Chios, Rhodes, had asserted their independence, or passed into the control of foreign potentates. Through the whole of the ten years which elapsed from the capture of Amphipolis to the fall of Olynthus, disaster had accompanied the Athenian arms. No doubt the failure was due to their own inaction. Nothing effective could be accomplished without personal service on the part of the citizens, and large contributions were needed in order to provide the sinews of war. But the Athenians would neither serve nor contribute. In vain had Demosthenes urged the absolute necessity of shaking off the fatal lethargy; the popular party, led by Eubulus and his friends, were unwilling to risk their position by unpleasant proposals, and the people naturally listened the most readily to those who made the fewest demands upon them. At length even Demosthenes was forced to confess that more would be gained by making peace than by continuing a war, which was no war at all. On the other part, Philip, already in 352 an attempt to enter the pass of Thermopylae had been prevented by the prompt action of the

*Reasons for
desiring
peace*

at Athens

*and on
Philip's
part.*

Athenian fleet, and he was aware that his present designs would meet with opposition at Athens. Before he provoked this opposition he wished to secure his power. Peace would also be grateful to the Macedonians. Their trade was ruined by the blockade of the ports, and they were unable to supply the deficiencies of their own country by importation. Hence there was a desire for peace on both sides; and on neither could the peace be genuine. It could only be a cessation of arms, in order to prepare for the greater conflict which was becoming inevitable.

- 2 In the year 348, when the Eubœan ambassadors were at Athens concluding a peace for that island, they were directed by Philip to inform the Athenians of his willingness to come to terms¹. Not long afterwards an Athenian named Phrynon, a man of the lowest character, was captured by Macedonian freebooters and compelled to pay a ransom for his liberty. When he arrived at Athens he begged that an envoy might be sent with him to represent his case to Philip, in order that he might recover the money paid. The request was granted by the people, and Ctesiphon was sent with Phrynon to Pella. On his return Ctesiphon not only gave an account of his mission, but also stated that Philip was anxious to bring the war to an end, and be at peace with Athens. The people were delighted at the news, and gave their approval to the proposal of Philocrates that Philip should be allowed to send a herald and envoys to Athens to open negotiations. The proposal was not without opponents, whom Aeschines represents as influenced by party spirit. An action for 'illegality' was got up by Lycianus and others, on the ground that all negotiations with Philip were forbidden by law, and the penalty was fixed at one hundred talents. When the case came on for trial, Philocrates was ill and unable to attend. Demosthenes undertook the defence, and at the end of the day Philocrates was acquitted. His opponents failed to obtain a fifth of the votes.

¹ Aesch. 2. 12 ff.

At this time (autumn 348 B. C.) occurred the capture and 3
destruction of Olynthus, which at once put an end to these
friendly negotiations. The fall of Olynthus seemed to leave
the way to Athens open; the mingled treachery
and force to which the ruin of the great city was due, *The fall of*
revealed Philip's power in its most real and formidable
aspect, while his treatment of the captives, *Olynthus*
whom he sold into slavery or gave as presents to his
friends, showed what Hellenes might expect if they fell into his
hands. On Athenian parties the effect was naturally to throw into
discredit Eubulus and his followers. To them, more than to any
one else, the dilatory policy was due, which had brought Athens
into such a position of danger and disgrace. The predictions of
Demosthenes had been more than verified. It was necessary for
the popular party to justify themselves in the eyes of the people,
and to rescue the city from the position into which their folly
had plunged her.

From this point of view Aeschines came forward as the oppo- 4
nent of Philip. Ignoring all that Demosthenes had said and
proposed, acting as though the *Olynthiacs* had never
been spoken, he claimed to be the first to point out
the plots of Philip against Hellas. His speech, *Aeschines*
if we may trust the account given of it by De-
mosthenes, was one of those displays of rhetoric in which
Aeschines loved to indulge. He read out the decrees proposed
in the glorious days of Athens by Miltiades and Themistocles,
and the oath taken by the young Athenian soldier on receiving
his arms from the state in the temple of Athena Aglauros. As
a proof of the mischief which Philip was doing in spite of
his friendly proposals, Ischander, an actor who had recently
returned from Arcadia, was brought forward to announce
that Philip was combining the Peloponnesus against
Athens. The speech ended with a proposal that *Envoys sent*
envoys should be sent out to rouse all Hellas
against the common enemy, and to invite the various
states to despatch plenipotentiaries to Athens to discuss the

situation. The proposal was accepted; and the envoys were sent,—Demosthenes ironically declares that they were sent ‘as far as the Red Sea.’ Aeschines visited the Peloponnesus in person.

- 5 It will be observed that Aeschines does not propose that Athens should take any immediate action against Philip. Not a word is said of new taxes or personal service; there is not a hint of that advice which Demosthenes so urgently pressed upon his countrymen; not the least suggestion that a radical change must be made in Athenian habits and dispositions before success can attend any measures against Philip. Aeschines does indeed assert that the Athenians are asleep, but the expression merely means that in his opinion they have not yet perceived the object of Philip’s plots,—an opinion which is quite groundless. So far is he from proposing vigorous measures, that he speaks of the plenipotentiaries as coming to Athens to discuss the question of war or peace!

- 6 The result was failure. It is doubtful whether any city responded to the call and sent ambassadors to Athens. From the North little could be expected. Thessaly was practically in the control of Philip; and central Greece was exhausted by the ‘Sacred war.’ In the Peloponnesus there was hopeless division. Some time previously the council of Megalopolis, in fear of Spartan aggression, had sent to Athens for assistance, and in spite of the earnest entreaties of Demosthenes assistance had been refused. Philip had seized the opportunity; he offered to support the Arcadians against Sparta, and in this way obtained a footing in the Peloponnesus. The Messenians also were not disinclined to welcome one who would aid them against their inveterate enemies. Argos was influenced by similar views. With such neighbours Sparta was unable, even if she wished, to spare men or money for foreign service, and in fact she never took any part in the struggle of Greece with Philip. Corinth was equally inactive. Of his own mission to Arcadia

Aeschines has left us an account. He spoke before the Ten Thousand at Megalopolis in opposition to Hieronymus the supporter of Philip, and pointed out what mischief the venal and corrupt partizans of Philip were doing *Aeschines in Arcadia.* to all Hellas, not to their own states only. On his return he indulged in violent abuse of Philip as a barbarian and a fiend, and gave a melancholy account of what he had seen on his journey home. He had met a Greek with a train of 30 women and children, and on enquiring who the man was, and what were the people with him, he was told that it was Atrestidas on his way from Olynthus with the captives which Philip had given him. Aeschines was so touched at the sight that he burst into tears, and lamented the condition of Greece, in which such iniquities could go unpunished. For no one had responded to his appeal. Some waited to see what would happen, others even took the field against Athens. Aeschines could do no more than propose that ambassadors should be sent to Arcadia to make formal accusations against the Macedonian party.

After such a failure it was natural that the desire for peace **7** should be renewed at Athens. Some measures of defence were indeed taken: Timarchus brought forward a proposal in the senate that any one who supplied Philip with materials for war should be put to death; Chares was despatched to watch Athenian interests on the coast of Thrace, where Cersobleptes, the king of the Odrysians, had just renewed hostilities with Philip—a movement due to the suggestions of Demosthenes. But the desertion of her allies during the Social War and the refusal of the independent cities to join in any common effort left Athens comparatively helpless. She was no longer, as in the days before 358 B. C., at the head of a confederacy which extended from Corcyra to Byzantium and Rhodes. Samos alone, among the larger islands, continued to pay tribute. Even Euboea was lost. The average amount of contributions received from the remnants of a league which had once numbered

*Renewed
desire for
peace.*