

**CORNELL STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY NO.8.
THOUGHT AND REALITY IN
HEGEL'S SYSTEM. A THESIS**

Published @ 2017 Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd

ISBN 9780649486700

Cornell Studies in Philosophy No.8. Thought and Reality in Hegel's System. A Thesis by
Gustavus Watts Cunningham

Except for use in any review, the reproduction or utilisation of this work in whole or in part in any form by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including xerography, photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, is forbidden without the permission of the publisher, Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd, PO Box 1576 Collingwood, Victoria 3066 Australia.

All rights reserved.

Edited by Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd.
Cover @ 2017

This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form or binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

www.triestepublishing.com

GUSTAVUS WATTS CUNNINGHAM

**CORNELL STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY NO.8.
THOUGHT AND REALITY IN
HEGEL'S SYSTEM. A THESIS**

CORNELL STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

No. 8

THOUGHT AND REALITY
IN HEGEL'S SYSTEM

BY

GUSTAVUS WATTS CUNNINGHAM, A.M.

FORMER FELLOW AND SCHOLAR IN THE SAGE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

A THESIS

PRESENTED TO THE UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

New York

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND COMPANY

FOURTH AVENUE AND THIRTIETH STREET

LONDON

BOMBAY

CALCUTTA

1910

PRINTED BY
THE NEW ERA PRINTING COMPANY
LANCASTER, PA.

PREFACE.

Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that there is no system of thought more intimately bound up with one fundamental principle than is the system of Hegel. Even a cursory reading of his works is sufficient to convince one that the doctrine of the Notion, whatever it may be, is basic to the system; and a more detailed study only forces the conviction home. In the *Phenomenology*, in the *Encyclopædia*, in the *History of Philosophy*, in the *Philosophy of Religion*, everywhere it is this doctrine of the Notion upon which emphasis is laid. Indeed, if one were to say that the entire system is just the explication of this doctrine, its elaboration by definition and application, one would be well within the bounds of justification. A correct interpretation of the system, consequently, depends upon a thorough comprehension of the doctrine of the Notion; if this doctrine is neglected, the system must remain a sealed book. The aim of the present monograph is to set forth this doctrine of the Notion, to emphasize its importance for a theory of knowledge, and, in the light of it, to give some insight into Hegel's conception of ultimate reality.

The first chapter of this study was read in part before the meeting of the American Philosophical Association at Cornell University in December, 1907. Subsequently it was published in an expanded form in *The Philosophical Review* (Vol. XVII, pp. 619-642), under the title "The Significance of the Hegelian Conception of Absolute Knowledge." My thanks are due to the editor of the *Review* for his permission to reprint it here substantially as it appeared there.

My very great indebtedness to various books and authors is sufficiently testified to by the footnotes. The references to the larger *Logic* are to the edition of 1841, published by Duncker and Humblot. The translations of Hegel's works, to which I have referred for assistance and from which I have freely quoted, are: W. Wallace, *The Logic of Hegel* (second edition, 1892); W. Wallace, *Philosophy of Mind* (1894); S. W. Dyde, *Philosophy*

of *Right* (1896); E. B. Speirs and J. B. Sanderson, *Philosophy of Religion* (three volumes, 1895); E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, *History of Philosophy* (three volumes, 1894); J. Sibree, *Philosophy of History* (reprint of 1902). I have not followed the translations verbatim in every case; but what few changes have been made are, I trust, not less faithful to the original.


To the members of the Sage School of Philosophy I am deeply indebted for many suggestions both consciously and unconsciously given. Professor G. H. Sabine, of Leland Stanford Jr. University, has read a portion of the study in manuscript and has aided me in the not very pleasant task of proof-reading. My heaviest debt of gratitude is to Professor J. E. Creighton, of Cornell University, at whose suggestion the study was first undertaken and under whose guidance and encouragement it has been brought to completion. The study would be much more imperfect than it now appears, were there not incorporated in it Professor Creighton's many valuable suggestions and criticisms. For the content of the monograph, however, I myself must alone be held responsible.

G. W. C.

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE,
September, 1910.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	Page
PART I. THOUGHT	1- 78
CHAPTER I. Thought as Objective and Universal.....	1- 24
CHAPTER II. The Process of Thought: Mediation and Negation.....	25- 45
CHAPTER III. Ontology and Epistemology.....	46- 78
 PART II. REALITY	 79-151
CHAPTER IV. Reality as Individual.....	79-113
CHAPTER V. The Personality of the Absolute.....	114-151



THOUGHT AND REALITY IN HEGEL'S SYSTEM

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

THOUGHT AS OBJECTIVE AND UNIVERSAL.

Perhaps no part of Hegel's system has been more persistently overlooked or misunderstood than has his doctrine of the nature of thought. Certainly no part of his system deserves to be more carefully studied. For this is the doctrine that is absolutely fundamental to his system; and it must be understood before any fair appreciation of his system can be arrived at or any just criticism of his contentions be advanced. To give an exposition of the Hegelian doctrine of thought, and to do this as much as is practicable in the author's own words, is the aim of this chapter.

Almost universally it is taken for granted that the *Logic* contains all that Hegel thought it worth while to say about the nature of thought. His epistemology is criticized and defended against criticism exclusively on the basis of the dialectical development of the categories, the assumption of both critic and champion being that here we find Hegel's last word concerning the nature of knowledge. That such an assumption is erroneous and leads to positive error in interpreting the Hegelian epistemology will, I trust, appear in what is to follow. The *Logic* does, indeed, purport to give an account of the essentially organic nature of thought, by showing how one category necessarily loses itself in its negative, which proves to be, not an abstract negative, but a negative that dialectically leads on to a more concrete synthesis of the two opposed categories. The *Logic* leads progressively from the abstract categories of Being, through the more concrete categories of Essence, to the still more concrete categories of the Notion; and finally to the most concrete cate-