

**APPENDICES TO THE SERMON
PREACHED BY THE REV. E.
B. PUSEY, D. D. ON THE
FIFTH OF NOVEMBER, 1837**

Published @ 2017 Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd

ISBN 9780649428687

Appendices to the Sermon Preached by the Rev. E. B. Pusey, D. D. on the Fifth of November,
1837 by Edward Bouverie Pusey

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Cover @ 2017

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EDWARD BOUVERIE PUSEY

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APPENDICES

TO THE

SERMON

PREACHED BY

THE REV. E. B. PUSEY, D.D.

ON THE

FIFTH OF NOVEMBER, 1837.

CONTAINING

I.

AN EXPLANATION OF POINTS MISTAKEN BY THE AUTHOR OF
"PASSIVE OBEDIENCE CONTRARY TO HOLY SCRIPTURE."

II.

REMARKS ON THE REVOLUTION OF 1688, AND THE PRINCIPLES
INVOLVED OR NOT INVOLVED IN ITS CONDEMNATION, IN ANSWER
TO AN ARTICLE OF THE EDINBURGH REVIEW.

III.

THE OXFORD DECREE OF 1683.



OXFORD,

J. H. PARKER ; J. G. AND F. RIVINGTON, LONDON.

1838.

869.

BAXTER, PRINTER, OXFORD.

APPENDIX I.

Remarks on some Statements in the " Doctrine of Passive Obedience contrary to Holy Scripture, by a Clergyman."

THE short interval which has elapsed since the first publication of this Sermon, has given room to few remarks upon it, so there is but little to observe. And indeed the doctrine contained in it, however contrary to the recognized maxims of many politicians, is probably still, if half unconsciously, that of religious people, and like a large body of sound principles besides, requires but to be stated, in order to be recognized as the truth and as having been previously, if less distinctly, held. There has been, happily, little occasion for its direct application, and so the better sort have been content to hold it in a general way, without applying it to any specific cases, or accurately settling its limits, or ascertaining whether they were consistent in admitting *any* exceptions or limitations to it, or whether Holy Scripture allowed of this. And many, doubtless, hold the doctrine as a whole, who have been taught to look upon the act of 1688 as an exception. Yet it cannot be too often inculcated, that the mind in every way is continually striving to right itself, and rid itself of inconsistency: and so it repeatedly happens, that the exception, if it be of any moment, will become the rule. In moral habits, as in maxims, or doctrines, a single allowed exception will nullify the force and influence of that which appears to be recognized or practised with almost the full consent of the mind or

will. There is danger to any principle or practice, as long as there is any opposed habit of thinking or acting, however slight. A single exception unnerves moral action, and loosens the hold of belief. Any exception to the doctrine of plenary inspiration, however minute the subject-matter, has prepared for the rejection of the whole; any unsoundness in what seemed the slightest shade of religious belief has ushered in entire unbelief; just as the slightest "letting out of water" is a token of the giving way of a barrier, the breaking down whereof deluges a whole country; or the slightest bowing of a wall is a prelude that it will in time fall; or a particle of decay in an apparently vigorous and flourishing tree an earnest that it will perish. It is then of more moment than many are aware, how we form our views upon any given point; it is not matter of historical speculation, or contentiousness about an abstract point, but an earnest practical question, whether we look upon the Revolution of 1688 as "glorious or inglorious." Uncompromisingness and unbendingness is the very condition of sound faith, moral action, right principle, consistent conduct, and, in detail, of any Christian grace, or virtuous habit; of honesty, for instance, or purity, as indeed is proverbial. One exception undoes more than many contrary actions do towards completeness. One, who admits habitually of any one exception however slight, to a given course of right action, is probably much less removed from him who is sunk lowest in the scale, than from perfect consistency. In the present case, our whole tone of feeling about the act of 1688 has, in the century and a half which has since elapsed, altogether varied from that of those who committed it; let any one read, in any common history, the account of the debates, doubts, palliations of those who were concerned in it, and contrast these with the exulting, or (which is more) the matter-of-course way, in which the "glorious Revolution"

is now spoken of, and he must vividly feel, that our principles of obedience are sunk very far below those of that time. Probably we are more akin, on the whole, to those who perpetrated the Revolution of 1793, than to the Christian submissiveness of the first ages of the Gospel; and if so, it will be of God's great mercy, but far more than man has any right to anticipate, if many of the atrocities of that last "atrocious Revolution" be not re-enacted among us, and London become not a Paris.

The few exceptions which have been lately taken to the principle of uniform passive obedience here inculcated have been such, as persons are wont to make, on the revival of doctrines, which for a time have slept, though they are, in truth, the uniform teaching of the great divines of our Church. Two or three points, however, have been noticed, by one, (on internal evidence a very young writer,) which since they have probably been felt by others, it may be well to clear up.

It is a vulgar error, that, because the King cannot rightly legislate without the counsel of his Parliament, therefore, the supreme power is divided between the King and his Parliament; and this is so taken, not only as matter of *fact*, but as matter of duty; that because the authority of the Sovereign is in some respects limited by law, therefore our allegiance no longer belongs to him alone, but is transferred to those institutions, by which it is limited; that "the Divine authority is lodged in the three [King, Lords, and Commons] conjointly," and so that our allegiance lies distributed among them. Hence it has been inferred, that if one "section of the supreme

* Doctrine of Passive Obedience to Kings *contrary* to Holy Scripture, by a Clergyman, p. 13.

power would tread under foot the laws by which its own rights are bounded, the remainder of the supreme powers are charged with the duty of restraining or chastising the unruly member^b;" i. e. in other words, if a king violates the laws, it is a sacred duty to chastise him !

This is probably a popular doctrine, in a sense other than this young writer takes it; for men like to be under the rule of an abstraction rather than of a personal being. To be under the rule of a *person* is something humiliating; the will is subjected to the will of another; but to be under the rule of an abstraction, as law, government, and the like, is to be under no rule at all, or, at the worst, one which we can change ourselves, or at least it keeps the ruler more out of sight. On the same principle, people speak of the Deity, the Divinity, Providence, Nature, as reminding them less of a Personal God, to Whom they are responsible, and Who, by His will, rules and controls theirs. And so it seems an ennobling thing to be under the rule of laws, both because the source of authority is thus shewn to emanate from ourselves, and we are in fact but paying obedience to our own will; and yet again, we seem to have yielded up some of the freedom of that will for a more enlarged good, and of our own free-will to obey, and still feel that we need no longer obey than our own collected will approves. Thus obeying, we are not subjected to a power without us, further that we have ourselves delegated the authority, and may resume it, when we will; in short, we are to govern ourselves, not be under the government of another. And this is the object of the democratic principle now at work throughout Europe.

It is an obvious answer to the fallacy of divided allegiance thus assumed, that no one takes an oath of allegiance to the Lords or Commons, nor to the laws, (although,

^b Ibid. p. 15.