

# **SUBJECT AND OBJECT**

Published @ 2017 Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd

ISBN 9780649177684

Subject and object by Johnston Estep Walter

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**JOHNSTON ESTEP WALTER**

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AND OBJECT**



# SUBJECT AND OBJECT

BY

REV. JOHNSTON ESTEP WALTER

Author of "The Perception of Space and Matter,"  
"The Principles of Knowledge," and "Nature  
and Cognition of Space and Time."



JOHNSTON AND PENNEY

WEST NEWTON PA.

1915

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J. F. TAPLEY CO.  
NEW YORK

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# SUBJECT AND OBJECT

## CHAPTER I

### THE SUBJECT OR SOUL

“To write a chapter for the purpose of showing that nothing is known, or can be known, of the subject which the title of the chapter indicates, will be thought strange.” These are the words with which Mr. H. Spencer opens the chapter in his *Psychology* on the “Substance of Mind.”<sup>1</sup> The present discussion has its occasion in the conviction that the human mind is a permanent entity or substance, which can be and is known; and the primary purpose of the discussion is to expound and defend that conception. This statement is made for the convenience of the reader, that at the very beginning he may know clearly and certainly the point of view and aim of the essay; and it is hoped he will not be repelled by the frank avowal.

But this purpose, it must be admitted, goes against what seems to be the main psychological tendency of the time. It is the contention of many that “the explanation of psychic life demands the complete elimination of the concept of substance”; and that the concept prevails only among “unreflective minds.” Some of the most zealous opponents deride mental substance as an “accursed idol.”

<sup>1</sup> *Psychology*, I, p. 145.