

**REFORMED LOGIC: A SYSTEM
BASED ON BERKELEY'S
PHILOSOPHY WITH AN ENTIRELY
NEW METHOD OF DIALECTIC**

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Reformed logic: a system based on Berkeley's philosophy with an entirely new method of dialectic by D. B. McLachlan

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D. B. MCLACHLAN

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BY

D. B. McLACHLAN

'Sensations are active, indivisible substances; IDEAS [objects] are inert, fleeting, dependent things, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances . . . The cause of Ideas is an incorporeal active SUBSTANCE or Spirit.'

—*Berkeley.*

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
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'Looking to the chaotic state of logic text-books at the present time, one would be inclined to say that there does not exist anywhere a recognised, currently-received body of speculation to which the title Logic can be unambiguously assigned, and that we must therefore resign the hope of attaining by any empirical consideration of the received doctrine, a precise determination of the nature and limits of logical theory.'

Encyc. Brit., Art. LOGIC.



P R E F A C E



THE object of the following treatise is to give an intelligible account of the principal facts of Mind, with a method for the right expression and criticism of Reasoning. It is based on principles not before applied to such a purpose. The current systems of Metaphysic are obscure and difficult simply because they start from false premises, not because the nature and operations of Mind cannot, if properly understood, be made as comprehensible to beginners as other branches of knowledge. The rules of Dialectic are quite within the capacity of any intelligent schoolboy, and should be an essential part of early education, like Arithmetic.

Let not the student be repelled at finding a philosophy reputed to be one of the most difficult taken as the basis of this work. It is Berkeleyism considerably modified. Also it is to be borne in mind

that a philosophy is not to be judged by its *prima facie* probability, but by its power of explaining many facts in a coherent and lucid way. A theory that does this should not be rejected for a seeming paradox at the outset.

Most of the theoretical and all the dialectical parts of this work can be adapted to Realistic thinking, by treating the judgments of the two Berkeleyan categories as intuitions instead of inferences.



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