

# **LOGIC: PART I**

Published @ 2017 Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd

ISBN 9780649638673

Logic: Part I by W. E. Johnson

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**W. E. JOHNSON**

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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

C. F. CLAY, MANAGER

LONDON : FETTER LANE, E.C. 4



NEW YORK : THE MACMILLAN CO.

BOMBAY

CALCUTTA

MADRAS

TORONTO : THE MACMILLAN CO. OF

CANADA, LTD.

TOKYO : MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA

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# LOGIC

## PART I

BY

W. E. JOHNSON, M.A. *Died wednesday  
January 14, 1931,  
at age 72.*

FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,  
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ΠΑΝΤΑ ΠΕΙ ΕΙ ΜΗ Τὸ ΔΑΛΟΕΣ

CAMBRIDGE  
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

1921

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71  
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pt. 1  
cop. 1

'MAN IS A RATIONAL ANIMAL'  
*Definition*

10604-8  
NOV 25 1966




## PREFACE

THE present work is intended to cover the whole field of Logic as ordinarily understood. It includes an outline of elementary Formal Logic, which should be read in close connection with Dr Keynes's classical work, in which the last word has been said on most of the fundamental problems of the subject. As regards Material Logic, I have taken Mill's *System of Logic* as the first basis of discussion, which however is subjected to important criticisms mostly on the lines of the so-called conceptualist logicians.

I have to express my great obligations to my former pupil, Miss Naomi Bentwich, without whose encouragement and valuable assistance in the composition and arrangement of the work, it would not have been produced in its present form.

W. E. J.

*March 30, 1921.*



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