

**AN INQUIRY RESPECTING THE  
SELF-DETERMINING POWER OF  
THE WILL: OR, CONTINGENT  
VOLITION, PP. 1-197**

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An Inquiry Respecting the Self-Determining Power of the Will: Or, Contingent Volition, pp. 1-197 by Jeremiah Day

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**JEREMIAH DAY**

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AN  
INQUIRY  
RESPECTING THE  
SELF-DETERMINING  
POWER OF THE WILL;  
OR  
CONTINGENT VOLITION.

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BY JEREMIAH DAY,  
PRESIDENT OF YALE COLLEGE.

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"I think that the notion of liberty, consisting in a *contingent self-determination of the will*, as necessary to the morality of men's dispositions and actions, is almost inconceivably pernicious; and that the contrary truth is one of the most important truths of moral philosophy that ever was discussed, and most necessary to be known." *President Edwards.*

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