

**THE LIFE OF REASON; OR, THE
PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS;
INTRODUCTION AND REASON
IN COMMON SENSE**

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The Life of Reason; or, the Phases of Human Progress; Introduction and Reason in Common Sense by George Santayana

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GEORGE SANTAYANA

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GEORGE SANTAYANA

INTRODUCTION
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