

**THE LOGIC OF NAMES: AN
INTRODUCTION TO
BOOLE'S LAWS OF
THOUGHT**

Published @ 2017 Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd

ISBN 9780649424603

The Logic of Names: An Introduction to Boole's Laws of Thought by I. P. Hughlings

Except for use in any review, the reproduction or utilisation of this work in whole or in part in any form by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including xerography, photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, is forbidden without the permission of the publisher, Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd, PO Box 1576 Collingwood, Victoria 3066 Australia.

All rights reserved.

Edited by Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd.
Cover @ 2017

This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form or binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

www.triestepublishing.com

I. P. HUGHLINGS

**THE LOGIC OF NAMES: AN
INTRODUCTION TO
BOOLE'S
LAWS OF THOUGHT**

BC
108
.H89

THE LOGIC OF NAMES.

with the Writer's Compliments

THE LOGIC OF NAMES.

AN INTRODUCTION

TO

BOOLE'S LAWS OF THOUGHT.

BY

I. P. HUGHLINGS.

"The symbolic language of Algebra, framed wholly on notions of number and quantity, is adequate, by what is certainly not an accident, to the representation of all the laws of thought."—DR MORGAN.

LONDON:

JAMES WALTON, 137, GOWER STREET.

1869.

5-5-41.Emulo

Vignaud
2-2-27

CONTENTS.

	PAGE.
INTRODUCTION	1
I. Logic	3
II. Mind	4
III. Thought	5
IV. Nervous Action	"
V. Naming	8
VI. Sensations	11
VII. Compound Sensations	12
VIII. Abstraction	20
IX. Consciousness	26
X. Grammar	28
XI. Words	"
XII. Names	39
XIII. Meaning	42
XIV. Relation	45
XV. Propositions	46
XVI. The Copula	47
XVII. Terms	48
XVIII. Logical Wholes	49
XIX. Logical Equality	53
XX. Numerical Values	54
XXI. Classification	58
XXII. Logical Addition	71
XXIII. Logical Subtraction	72
XXIV. Predication	74
XXV. Predicables	77
XXVI. Logical Multiplication	78
XXVII. Negative Propositions	80
XXVIII. Calculus of Logic	82

ADVERTISEMENT.

PRIMARILY these pages are an attempt to independently think out and popularly interpret some of the principles characteristic of Mr. John Stuart Mill's Logic, of the late Professor Boole's Laws of Thought, and of Mr. De Morgan's various publications on the same class of subjects.

The following special objects have been aimed at:—

1st. To, so far as possible, divest of their mathematical dress the foundations of Professor Boole's theory.

2nd. To independently and popularly expound and interpret these foundations.

3rd. To include in this exposition some account of certain phrases and doctrines which have been taken and adopted from the logic of the past by common language and general literature.

I. P. H.

THE LOGIC OF NAMES.

INTRODUCTION.—Man is a result of the operation of forces, some of which are known, and some unknown; the former subjects of knowledge, the latter subjects of belief. To the unknown we give the name of Soul; those that are known we refer either to Mind or to Body. By the distinction of Mind and Body is not necessarily implied that between material and immaterial. The immaterial we refer to the unknown, to what is subject of belief; but the material each man divides for himself into that which he cannot separate from his own individuality, and that which he can so separate. Such a distinction is manifestly both ambiguous and fluctuating. It is ambiguous, because it may be understood in two senses. We may draw the dividing line through different systems of points. It is fluctuating, because, wherever placed in the first instance, no subsequent tracing will repeat it. The line may be drawn so as to separate all the matter which composes the individual's body from other matter. Such a line is uncertain to the kitten, which runs after its own tail, and to the human

being who, applying crossed fingers to the tip of his nose, imagines for an infinitesimal portion of time that he has two noses. A cultivated man attempts to draw the line so as to include the thinking part of his material frame only. Or, rather, he assumes the line to be drawn, and calls all on one side Mind, all on the other Body. When he sees a case of conscious insanity, a madman who knows he is mad, his line fades away from even his imagination.

The distinction between Mind and Body now to be insisted on is this,—that the former is connected with Soul, and so connected as not in our thoughts to be either separable from it or combinable with it, while in our knowledge it is both. Mind is mutable and destructible by material agencies, Soul is not. Mind is materially manifestible, Soul is not. We ourselves are the two together; yet how can the material act with the immaterial?

But if Mind is that part of matter, or is involved indissolubly with that part of matter which a man in thought is forced to segregate into his own individuality,—if it is that part of matter which enters into the constitution of the man, what is shown to us of it is a very small portion either of Mind or Man. We can only see so much of it as is revealed in the mirror of language; and that much, while not all its length and breadth, is none of its depth. The province of Logic, however, is, in all directions, determined by the scope of language. Logic, accepting the

limitation so prescribed, is careful, in defining the field of its speculations, not to pronounce any opinion on what may lie outside the area thus set apart.

I. LOGIC.—Logic is the name of the science, or art, or instrument, in obedience to which, or by means of which, we analyse verbal representations of mental affections. As a science, logic professes to give an account of the laws which words necessarily obey when they are used in exhibiting processes of thought. As an art or instrument, it furnishes, or is used to furnish, rules by which thinkers may be guided to the correction of inaccuracies of thought or expression. A book which gives an account of logic is called a *Logic*.*

* Compare *De Morgan's* *Syllabus of Logic*, Section 1st.

Logic has also been defined "as the science of the conditions on which correct thoughts depend, and the art of attaining to correct, and avoiding incorrect, thoughts"; and as "the art of thinking, which means of correct thinking, and the science of the conditions of correct thinking." Sir *William Hamilton* defines logic as "the science of the laws of thought as thought." His remarks on the terms of this definition may be summarised as follows:—1st. Logic is from the Greek adjective *λογική*, itself from *λόγος*, a substantive which meant, sometimes, "thought," sometimes, "the expression of thought." It was equivalent both to the *ratio* and to the *oratio* of the Latins. 2nd. Logic is a science, because it is a branch of knowledge. The distinction between logic as a science, and logic as an art, at best only amounts to saying that it can be viewed in more than one way; that it is a science when viewed absolutely, and not in relation to practice; an art when viewed as the application to practice of knowledge. Even this distinction, however, which distinguishes nothing, is