

**THE  
INTELLECTUALISM  
OF LOCKE. AN ESSAY**

Published @ 2017 Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd

ISBN 9780649614592

The Intellectualism of Locke. An Essay by Thomas E. Webb

Except for use in any review, the reproduction or utilisation of this work in whole or in part in any form by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including xerography, photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, is forbidden without the permission of the publisher, Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd, PO Box 1576 Collingwood, Victoria 3066 Australia.

All rights reserved.

Edited by Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd.

Cover @ 2017

This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form or binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

[www.triestepublishing.com](http://www.triestepublishing.com)

**THOMAS E. WEBB**

**THE  
INTELLECTUALISM  
OF LOCKE. AN ESSAY**



THE  
INTELLECTUALISM OF LOCKE:

*An Essay.*

BY  
THOMAS E. WEBB, M. A.



DUBLIN:  
WILLIAM M'GEE & CO.  
LONDON: LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, LONGMANS, & ROBERTS.  
1857.

265. a. 126.

TO  
THE RIGHT REVEREND  
WILLIAM FITZGERALD, D.D.,  
LORD BISHOP OF CORK, CLOYNE, AND ROSS,

**This Essay**

IS DEDICATED,  
IN GRATITUDE FOR THE INTEREST HE HAS TAKEN IN ITS PROGRESS,  
AND IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF  
THE BENEFIT IT HAS DERIVED FROM HIS SUGGESTIONS.



## PREFACE.

---

THE object of this Book is indicated by its Title. It professes to establish by a rigorous analysis of the Essay concerning Human Understanding, that Locke is neither a Sensualist, ignoring the existence of any Elements of Thought but those supplied by the External Senses, nor an Empiricist, recognising the existence of no Elements of Thought but those supplied by Sense, External or Internal. It professes to establish that Locke, on the contrary, as recognising Ideas of which Intellect is properly the source, and Cognitions of which Intellect is exclusively the guarantee, is an Intellectualist—an Intellectualist in the sense of Reid and Kant.

To enunciate this doctrine is to proclaim that Locke's Philosophy has hitherto been interpreted by opposites. Any attempt to propitiate the prepossessions of the Reader in such a case is plainly out of the question ; the utmost I can hope is to



guard against misapprehension. To secure this object I shall give, though at the expense of any interest which my Essay might otherwise possess, a synopsis of the results at which it professes to have arrived.

In the First Chapter, then, I give a brief sketch of the History of Locke's Philosophy, and point out certain antecedent probabilities in favour of my general conclusion. In the Second, I show that Locke regarded our Ideas neither as Separate Entities, nor as Latent Modifications of Mind, but as Percipient Acts ;—in other words, that his Ideal Theory was identical with that of Arnauld. In the Third, I show that Locke was not misled by an *Ignis Fatuus* in his Polemic against Innate Ideas, on the one hand ; and that, on the other, he systematically recognised the element of truth of which the Doctrine of Innate Ideas was the disguised expression. In the Fourth, I determine the meaning attached by Locke to the words Sensation and Reflection, and show that in declaring Sensation and Reflection to be the sole "Originals" of our Ideas, Locke merely contemplated the Chronological Conditions of Thought. In the Fifth, I show that, ulterior to Sensation and Reflection, Locke recog-

nises the Understanding itself as a principle genetic of Ideas which Sensation and Reflection are wholly incompetent to give. In the Sixth, I show that Locke anticipated the Kantian distinction of Knowledge into *A posteriori* and *A priori*, Synthetic and Analytic. In the Seventh, I endeavour to systematize Locke's views on the subject of the Three Ontologic Realities, the World, the Soul, and God. In the Eighth, I endeavour to perform the same office with respect to his views on Freedom and the Moral Law. In the Ninth, by a minute comparison of Locke's doctrines with those of Hume and Kant, I endeavour to show that Hume's doctrine was not the sceptical development, but the dogmatic reversal, of that of Locke, and that Locke, on all the fundamental questions of Psychology, was agreed with Kant, though with regard to the Science of Metaphysics the two Philosophers diverged.

These conclusions are so utterly alien to the accredited Criticism of the last hundred and fifty years, that, perhaps, I may be suspected of having failed to comprehend the nature of the question I have undertaken to discuss. To obviate this suspicion, I have selected as the expression of the received opinions on the subject of Locke's Philosophy, the two

greatest Philosophers which this generation has produced—M. Cousin and Sir William Hamilton. I have selected these from the great mass of Locke's Critics for a variety of reasons. In the first place, their acquaintance with the general Problems of Philosophy was so accurate, and their expression of Philosophical Opinion so clear, that a controversy which would have been vague when directed against others, becomes definite when directed against them. In the second place, the present reputation of these Philosophers stands so high, that a professed exposure of their errors of Criticism would be more likely to attract attention than any professed exposition of the Philosophy of Locke. In the third place, I must acknowledge the existence of some such feeling as that which animated the Unknown Knight in *Ivanhoe*, and, instead of selecting as antagonists those whose seat was least sure, I have preferred touching the shield of the most redoubted champions that the lists of Metaphysics can supply.

Should any professional Critic deem the subject worthy of his notice, all I would ask is, that he will study it with the attention which, from its very nature, the subject itself demands. This Essay professes to expose an error which for a century and a