

**MARCI TULLII CICERONIS
DE OFFICIIS LIBRI TRES,
FROM THE TEXT OF ZUMPT,
CAREFULLY REVISED**

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Marci Tullii Ciceronis De Officiis Libri Tres, from the Text of Zumpt, Carefully Revised by
Marcus Tullius Cicero & George B. Wheeler

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WITH NOTES

BY THE

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EDITOR OF "WETTENHALL'S GREEK GRAMMAR," &c.,
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PREFACE.

THE three books *De Officiis* belong to the exoteric works of Cicero on the philosophy of morals. Although the illustrations are chiefly derived from Roman history, the foundation of the work is confessedly of Greek origin. In the first two books Cicero follows the treatise *περὶ καθήκοντος* of Panætius; but these books contain many hints derived from other Greek writers. The third book is founded on a treatise by Hecato the Stoic concerning the same subject. It is virtually a short essay on casuistry.

The three books are addressed to his son Marcus, who at the time of their composition was residing at Athens, under the instruction of Cratippus, the Peripatetic. The work was written in the latter end of August, B.C. 44.

In preparing this edition for the press, I have endeavoured to give all that was necessary for the elucidation of the text in the most concise form possible. The text is that of Zumpt,

and many of the notes are translated and abbreviated from the larger edition of that critic. I have incorporated also many short observations from the Heusingers.

The books *De Officiis* were carefully and widely studied during the middle ages; and an edition of the work by Fust and Schöffer (Mayence, 1465) is amongst the earliest specimens of typography. No classical work is more generally adopted in our educational institutions in the present day than the *De Officiis*; and I know of none which has claims to displace it. In my experience, I have found that the best Latin writers among my pupils were those who had most carefully perused this most careful and elaborate composition.

GEORGE B. WHEELER, A.M.,
Trin. Col., Dub.

June 1st, 1863.

MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO
DE OFFICIIS
AD
MARCUM FILIUM.
LIBER PRIMUS.
ARGUMENTUM.

Cum Cicero, Reipublicæ libertate sublata, se ad philosophiæ studium retulisset, multosque illustres ejus locos Latinis literis illustrasset, suscepit ad filium, Athenis studiis literarum operam dantem, de officiis scribere, non modo, ut hic quoque locus, qui latissime patet, Latinis literis illustraretur, sed etiam, quod esset ætati Ciceronis filii et auctoritati parentis aptissimus. Quamquam autem hæc quæstio communis est omnium philosophorum; tamen his penè propria est, qui summum bonum honestate metuntur, nempe Academicorum, Peripateticorum, et Stoicorum, qui in constituendo summo bono verbis magis, quam re, discrepabant. Scentes ergo Cicero est in hac quæstione potissimum Stoicos, et ex eorum fontibus, judicio arbitratoque suo, quantum, quoque modo visum est, hausit. Tradita officii et definitione et divisione, quinque facit genera deliberationis in consilio capiundo; primum, honestumne factu sit an turpe, quod in deliberationem cadit; alterum, conducatur an noceat; reliqua vero, ubi cum honesto pugnat id quod videtur utile, et cum aliud alio honestius aut utilius videtur, utrum alteri sit preponendum. In tres igitur partes totam disputationem distribuit, quarum prima est de honesto, altera de utili; sed dupliciter utraque; et tertia de comparatione eorum. Primum formam quandam honesti exhibet a natura humana ductam, ejusque quatuor partes facit, sapientiam, justitiam, temperantiam, et fortitudinem seu magnitudinem animi, ex quibus singulis certa quedam officia nascuntur, cap. 4. Ac de his quatuor partibus fuse disputat, et quomodo ab his officia ducuntur, ostendit, cap. 5. 42. Huic disputationi subjicit de comparatione honesti, de duobus honestis utrum honestius, cap. 43, &c.—**ERNESTUS.**

De his libris Plinius in præfatione: *Quæ volumina ejus edicenda, non modo in manibus habenda nobis.* Incepit eos scribere mortuo Cæsare, cum solus consul esset Antonius, Epist. 13. lib. xv. ad Attic. Sed absolvit Hirtio et Pansa coæs. paulo ante mortem suam, ut cognoscitur e libro xvi. earundem epistolarum.—**MURÆTUS.**

LIBER PRIMUS.

I. QUAMQUAM te, Marce fili, annum jam audientem Cratippum, idque Athenis, abundare oportet præceptis institutisque philosophiæ, propter summam et doctoris auctoritatem et urbis; quorum alter te scientia augere potest, altera exemplis: tamen, ut ipse ad meam utilitatem semper cum Græcis Latina conjunxi, neque id in philosophia solum, sed etiam in dicendi exercitatione feci; id tibi censeo faciendum, ut par sis in utriusque orationis facultate. Quam quidem ad rem nos, ut videmur, magnum attulimus adjumentum hominibus nostris, ut non modo Græcarum litterarum rudes, sed etiam docti, aliquantum se arbitrentur adeptos et ad dicendum, et ad judicandum. Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe hujus ætatis philosophorum, et disces, quam diu voles: tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non pœnitebit. Sed tamen nostra legens, non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utriusque et Socratici et Platonici esse volumus; (de rebus ipsis utere tuo judicio, nihil enim impedio) orationem autem Latinam profecto legendis nostris efficias pleniorum. Nec vero arroganter hoc dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte, ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio ætatem consumsi, si id mihi assumo, videor id meo jure quodam modo vindicare. Quam ob rem magno opere te hortor, mi Cicero, ut non solum orationes meas, sed hos etiam de philosophia libros, qui jam illis fere æquarunt, studiosè legas. Vis enim dicendi major est in illis, sed hoc quoque colendum est æquabile et temperatum orationis genus. Et id quidem nemini video Græcorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere elaboraret, sequereturque et

illud forense dicendi, et hoc quietum disputandi genus: nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens; dulcis tamen, ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere. Nos autem quantum in utroque profecerimus, aliorum sit iudicium: utrumque certe secuti sumus. Equidem et Platonem existimo, si genus forense dicendi tractare voluisset, gravissime et copiosissime potuisse dicere; et Demosthenem, si illa, quæ a Platone didicerat, tenuisset et pronuntiare voluisset, ornate splendideque facere potuisse. Eodemque modo de Aristotele et Isocrate iudico: quorum uterque suo studio delectatus contempsit alterum.

II. Sed cum statuissem scribere ad te aliquid hoc tempore, multa posthac, ab eo ordiri volui maxime, quod et ætati tuæ esset aptissimum, et auctoritatî meæ. Nam cum multa sint in philosophia et gravia et utilia accurate copioseque a philosophis disputata: latissime patere videntur ea, quæ de officiis tradita ab illis et præcepta sunt. Nulla enim vitæ pars neque publicis, neque privatis, neque forensibus, neque domesticis in rebus; neque si tecum agas quid, neque si cum altero contrahas, vacare officio potest: in eoque et colendo sita vitæ est honestas omnis, et in negligendo turpitudô. Atque hæc quidem quæstio communis est omnium philosophorum. Quis est enim, qui nullis officii præceptis tradendis philosophum se audeat dicere? Sed sunt nonnullæ disciplinæ, quæ propositis bonorum et malorum finibus officium omne pervertunt. Nam qui summum bonum sic instituit, ut nihil habeat cum virtute conjunctum, idque suis commodis, non honestate metitur; hic si sibi ipse consentiat et non interdum naturæ bonitate vincatur, neque amicitiam colere possit, nec justitiam, nec liberalitatem. Fortis vero, dolorem summum malum iudicans, aut temperans, voluptatem summum bonum statuens, esse certe nullo modo potest. Quæ