

HEGELIANISM AND PERSONALITY

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Hegelianism and personality by Andrew Seth

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ANDREW SETH

**HEGELIANISM
AND PERSONALITY**

Balfour Philosophical Lectures,
University of Edinburgh.

HEGELIANISM AND
PERSONALITY

BY

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IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS

SECOND SERIES OF BALFOUR LECTURES



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PREFATORY NOTE.

THE following Lectures, forming the second series of Balfour Philosophical Lectures, were delivered in the University of Edinburgh at the close of last winter session. They take up the questions which were suggested by the concluding lecture of the previous course on Scottish Philosophy; but they will be found to depend for intelligibility on nothing beyond themselves. In preparing for publication, I have adhered to the lecture form; but in what now stands as the third and fourth lectures, I have found it desirable to alter the arrangement of topics which was adopted in delivery. I have also endeavoured, by occasional changes and additions, and by the help of Appendices and fuller references, to bring

into relief the chief points on which my criticism turns, and at the same time, by more careful definition, to avoid the possibility of misconception.

ST ANDREWS, *October* 1887.

CONTENTS.

LECTURE I.

KANT AND NEO-KANTIANISM.

	PAGE
Relation of these Lectures to the previous course on Scotch Philosophy—English Neo-Kantianism or Neo-Hegelianism—Green's Spiritual Principle—Source of the conception in German philosophy—Sketch of the following Lectures—Results of the Kantian philosophy—Refutation of the sensational atomism of Hume—Time, space, and the categories—The Self or Subject—The terms synthetic and transcendental as applied to the Ego—The transcendental and the empirical Self—The transcendental method—Kant unfaithful to his own principles—Legitimate outcome of the transcendental method—Mr Shadworth Hodgson's statement of the position—Neo-Kantianism transforms Kant's theory of knowledge into a metaphysic of existence—Green's account of the Spiritual Principle—It represents merely the formal unity of the universe—Kant's insistence on the abstract character of his inquiry—Neo-Kantianism illegitimately converts "consciousness in general" into "a universal consciousness"—Ferrier's more cautious argument—Negative or critical attitude of the theory of knowledge—Kant's own position, . . .	1
APPENDIX TO LECTURE I. Leibnitian elements in Kant's doctrine of things-in-themselves,	36

LECTURE II.

FICHTE.

Fichte the first to transform Kant's theory of knowledge into an absolute metaphysic—His constitutionally synthetic mind—Every philosophy must be a Monism—Dogmatism and Idealism as the only two possible types of philosophy—Impossibility of explaining the Self by action <i>ab extra</i> —Fichte's distinction between the Absolute Ego and the empirical self—His speculative explanation of the given element in knowledge—The Non-Ego and the origin of consciousness—A series of mechanical metaphors—Fichte disclaims this interpretation of his theory—Exclusively practical character of his idealism at this period—It leaves no permanent reality in the universe—Later forms of his theory—Disuse of the term Ego—Schelling's Absolute a relapse into Spinozism—The inevitable result of substantiating the logical unity of thought as a creative Self—Fascination of the conception—Taken as a metaphysic, it deprives both God and man of real existence—Fichte's later developments—Life or Nature as the <i>prius</i> of individuals—Knowledge as independent and self-existent—Existence of God out of and beyond the process of evolution,	39
APPENDIX TO LECTURE II. Green's account of feeling,	74

LECTURE III.

THE RELATION OF HEGEL'S LOGIC TO EXPERIENCE.

Hegel's relation to Fichte and Schelling—The notion of development in Hegel—Hegel's relation to Kant—The Logic as the centre of the system—An immanent criticism of categories—Hegel's Anthropomorphism	
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defended—Dependence of the dialectic on experience
 —Trendelenburg's criticisms—Order of exposition re-
 verses the order of thought by which the results were
 reached—True explanation of the onward impulse in
 the Method—The Absolute Idea derived by Hegel
 from the human self-consciousness, 79

LECTURE IV.

LOGIC AS METAPHYSIC : THOUGHT AND REALITY.

Relation of Hegel's Logic to his Philosophy of Nature and
 Philosophy of Spirit—The Absolute Idea and the Ab-
 solute Spirit—Identification of Logic with Metaphysics
 —The transition from Logic to Nature—Impossibility
 of such deduction—An absolute philosophy must con-
 struct everything as a necessity of thought—Compara-
 son between Hegel and Plato—The endeavour to con-
 struct existence out of abstract thought—Hegel's scorn
 for "Being" involves a fallacy—Nature as the other
 of thought—Things merely exemplifications of logical
 notions—Hegel's statements only true as metaphors—
 Identity of Knowing and Being in this sense impossible
 —Illustration from Schelling—True conclusion from
 Hegel's own admissions—Hegel's account of Nature
 as a system of types—Non-rational character of Nature
 as a mere collocation—Hegel's use of the term Con-
 tingency, 101

APPENDIX TO LECTURE IV. Kant and Fichte on the ques-
 tion of real existence, 141

LECTURE V.

HEGEL'S DOCTRINE OF GOD AND MAN.

Hegel evades the questions of the divine existence and
 human immortality—Ambiguity of the terms Spirit