

**VENIZELOS AND THE  
WAR, A SKETCH OF  
PERSONALITIES AND  
POLITICS**

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Venizelos and the war, a sketch of personalities and politics by Crawford Price

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**CRAWFURD PRICE**

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**VENIZELOS AND THE WAR**

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# VENIZELOS

AND

## THE WAR

*A Sketch of Personalities and Politics*

BY  
**CRAWFURD PRICE**  
AUTHOR OF "THE BALKAN COCKPIT," "LIGHT ON THE  
BALKAN DARKNESS," ETC.

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## PREFACE

I HAVE compiled this sketch of personalities and politics in order to meet the very widespread desire to know more of the developments which have led up to the present extraordinary situation in Greece, and I am hopeful that it will assist the public to a better understanding of the political evolution which culminated in the departure of M. Venizelos for Crete and Salonika.

In principle, I have limited my digressions to those cases where I have considered it desirable to guide the reader to a correct appreciation of cause and effect, and the several references to Entente diplomacy have been included—and necessarily included—rather because its action was an important factor in the problem under consideration, than from any desire to add to the chorus of criticism evoked by its failure.

Since we are still in the midst of armed conflict, there are some parts of the story which I have left untold; but their exclusion in no way affects the general argument. There are other disclosures which I would, perhaps, have suppressed; but they have been made public in Athens, and there can

be no logical objection to acquainting the people of this country with facts that are known alike to our friends and our enemies. I have confined myself to M. Venizelos's own lucid explanation of the "invitation" to Salonika, instead of proceeding to a *résumé* of the diplomatic documents concerned. Similarly, in the matter of the Russian objection to Greece's participation in the Dardanelles expedition, I have said no more than has already been published by M. Jean Dragoumis in the Athens *Revue Politique*.

The manuscript of this book was dictated during the last days of October and the first week of November. Since then much interesting news has been telegraphed from Athens, all of which lends confirmation to the information contained herein. We have received additional evidence that the Greek authorities were a party to the Germano-Bulgarian occupation of Fort Rupel, and have learned that the proposal for intervention put forward by the Kalogeropoulos Ministry at least offered a basis for negotiation.

One cannot but regret that it has not been found possible to employ the resources of the Entente to restore national unity in Greece. In their note of June 21st the Powers clearly indicated that they considered it their right and duty to restore Constitutional Government. *Force majeure* prevented the holding of new elections, and, this being the case, it is a question whether it would not have been wiser in the best interests of the Allies,



Greece, and King Constantine himself, to have insisted upon the dissolution of a Chamber which we stated "represents only a fraction of the Electorate," and its replacement by the Parliament which we insinuated was unconstitutionally dissolved by His Majesty in the summer of 1915. This would have necessitated strong action; but it could probably have been accomplished by the application of measures less rigorous than those which have since been taken against the Greek State for objects much less valuable. The present anomaly will have to be cleared up sooner or later; and it is improbable that there can be a voluntary reconciliation between King Constantine and M. Venizelos, or that the existing *status quo* in Greece can continue after the war.

If we are sincere in our devotion to the causes of freedom, justice and righteousness, then this Venizelist movement is one which ought to receive our unstinted support and full official acknowledgment. If we are determined in our intention to crush militarism in Europe, then it is illogical for us to support any offshoot of it in the Balkans.

C. P.

LONDON,  
November 15th, 1916.

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