PROLEGOMENA TO HISTORY. THE RELATION OF HISTORY TO LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND SCIENCE

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Prolegomena to History. The Relation of History to Literature, Philosophy, and Science by Frederick J. Teggart

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BY

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I

INTRODUCTION

In an address on "The Study of History," delivered at the University of Glasgow in 1884, Principal Caird set in a clear light the problem that lies before History as a university study. "The expediency," he said, "of introducing the study of history into a university curriculum turns upon the question whether history is capable of scientific treatment. Knowledge which has not yet been elevated out of the domain of facts and details, which has not submitted itself to the grasp of principles, or become in some measure illuminated and harmonized by the presence of law, cannot, I suppose, be regarded as a fit instrument of the higher education."

To this challenge there has been no adequate response on the part of those who are professionally engaged in the study and teaching of history. In England and America it is only on rare

¹ John Caird, University Addresses (Glasgow, 1899), pp. 225-26.

occasions that the professor of history seems disposed to lay aside the presentation of assured fact in order to consider the nature of the foundation upon which his constructions rest. Hence it is that most of our contributions to historical theory are to be found in the inaugural lectures of university professorships and the presidential addresses of historical societies and associations. Possibly the subjects of these communications, which have much in common, are considered too general and debatable to be offered in regular courses of instruction; possibly it is only upon such important occasions that the scholar may look for an audience sufficiently expert to justify him in taking up problems of admitted complexity, and it may be that the speaker welcomes the opportunity to express his matured convictions. It is evident, indeed, that these are not perfunctory speeches; they are, without exception, informed by a spirit of earnestness, which, however, not infrequently cloaks hesitating thought. measure all these pronouncements, it must be admitted, are excursions into unfamiliar territory, and betray an air of having been written under pressure, rather than of being the spontaneous expression of familiar ideas. However this may be, the fact remains that the English-speaking representatives of historical scholarship, when called upon to stand out for a moment from among their fellows, find that the particulars which they themselves have been investigating can not be relied upon to make a general appeal, and so it comes that cherished researches are temporarily neglected for the brief advocacy of some view of the nature and utility of history. Restricted to such situations, it is not remarkable that the consideration of the fundamental problems of historical study has shown but little vitality during the last fifty years. Assertion evokes rejoinder-Freeman will have none of Stubbs, and Firth improves upon Bury-and each latest speaker is sensitive to the lapses of his immediate predecessors. Thus the problems, lightly touched, remain, like politics and religion, subjects on which every man is presumed to have an opinion, but which the taste of the moment places outside the pale of direct and sustained discussion.

Among historical scholars there still is disagreement as to whether history is or may become a science, though there seems to be unanimity of opinion that some part, at least, of historical work is "scientific." "Whether," said Stubbs, "we look at the dignity of the subject-matter, or at the nature of the mental exercise which it requires, or at the inexhaustible field over which the pursuit ranges, History, the knowledge of the adventures, the development, the changeful career, the varied growths, the ambitions, aspirations, and, if you like, the approximating destinies of mankind, claims a place second to none in the roll of sciences."2 Bury would have us remember always that though history "may supply material for literary art or philosophical speculation, she is herself simply a science, no less and no more." Villari, after passing in review the opinions held on the question, reaches the conclusion that "History can never be converted into a philosophical system nor into a natural or mathematical science. Nor would it even be possible to attain that purpose by forcing it to use methods appertaining to other studies."4

Among philosophers and men of science opinion on the subject is equally varied. "A science of history in the true sense of the term," Jevons said, "is an absurd notion. . . . In human affairs, the smallest causes may produce the greatest effects, and the real application of scientific method is out of the question." Sidgwick did not "consider History a Science, so far as it is merely concerned with presenting particular events in chronological order."

The uncertainty of the situation is shown further by the criticisms which, while condemning the present methods of historical scholars, express confidence in the possibility of a

² William Stubbs, Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History (Oxford, 1887), p. 85.

³ J. B. Bury, An Inaugural Lecture (Cambridge, 1903), p. 42.

^{*}Pasquale Villari, Studies, Historical and Critical (New York, 1907), p. 108.

⁵ W. S. Jevons, The Principles of Science (London, 1883), p. 761.

⁶ Henry Sidgwick, Philosophy, its Scope and Relations (London, 1902), p. 4, note.

science of history. Karl Pearson remarks that "historians have assumed . . . that history is all facts and no factors." He himself thinks that "natural history, the evolution of organic nature, is at the basis of human history," and that "only when history is interpreted in this sense of natural history does it pass from the sphere of narrative and become science." Hobhouse, looking beyond existing limitations, believes that "we can conceive as not indefinitely remote a stage of knowledge in which the human species should come to understand its own development, its history, conditions, and possibilities, and on the basis of such an understanding should direct its own future."

It will be evident from the conflict of opinion thus exhibited that we are here confronted with a problem at once of difficulty and importance. Mere expression of opinion cannot, however, advance the discussion further—the only way open is to institute an inquiry into the nature and characteristics, on the one hand, of Science, and, on the other, of History.

⁷ Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science (2d ed., London, 1900), pp. 358-59.

⁸ L. T. Hobhouse, Mind in Evolution (London, 1901), p. 336.

II

THE METHOD OF SCIENCE

What distinguishes the work of contemporary physicists or biologists from that of historical scholars is the critical selfconsciousness of the former in regard to the mental processes involved in research and discovery. Scientific methodology deals primarily with the psychological analysis of the investigator's mode of thought. The purpose of this analysis, as Stallo remarked, is to eliminate from science its latent metaphysical elements, to foster the spirit of experimental investigation, and to accredit the great endeavor of scientific research to gain a sure foothold on solid empirical ground.1 Science recognizes that all investigation proceeds in the human mind; it takes account of the fact that the order in which ideas associate themselves differs radically from the order manifested by phenomena in external nature; and it acts upon the principle that only by maintaining a constant surveillance over what goes on in our minds is it possible to determine what goes on outside.

"Natural laws are formulae which express the constant relations existing between phenomena, as distinguished from association of ideas in the subjective consciousness."2

"Now the principle of arrangement in the actual world, i.e., in nature, is not logical, but it is a kind of divine confusion, and whenever we destroy this we step out of the region of the natural into that of the artificial."

Historical investigators, on the other hand, have made a policy of ignoring these preliminaries in favor of getting at once to the

¹ J. B. Stallo, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (New York,

^{1882),} p. 8.
² Friedrich Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, tr. by Frank Thilly (2d ed., New York, 1906), p. 376.

³ J. T. Merz, "On a General Tendency of Thought during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century," University of Durham Philosophical Society, Proceedings, 3 (1910), 316.