

**ENGLISH GRAMMAR,
INCLUDING THE
PRINCIPLES OF
GRAMMATICAL ANALYSIS**

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English Grammar, Including the Principles of Grammatical Analysis by C. P. Mason

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THE PRINCIPLES OF GRAMMATICAL ANALYSIS.



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PREFACE TO THE FOURTEENTH EDITION.

THE publication of the fourteenth edition of the present work renders it superfluous to enter into an elaborate justification of those views and methods which distinguish it from previous works on the same subject. The improvements which I have striven to introduce have met with the cordial approbation of many thoughtful writers, and are gradually being adopted by other labourers in the same field. In fact, I have never yet met with a serious attempt to controvert any of the principles that are set forth in this work. The results which I steadily aimed to secure were exactness in definition, and thoroughness in investigating the grammatical force of words, and their structure in sentences. That learners advance more rapidly when these points are carefully attended to, I know by long and wide experience both as a teacher and as an examiner.

In grammar, as in every other science, the accuracy of the *definitions* is of vital importance. They must be such that there shall be no ambiguity in their terms, and that they shall be *convertible*; that is, that the description given as a definition of the thing defined shall apply to it, *and to nothing else*; so that the definition remains true when read conversely. To say that "a square is a plane rectilinear figure with four equal sides," would not be to give a definition, because it is not true that "a (i.e. *any*) plane rectilinear figure with four equal sides is a square." No doubt, it is often difficult to give perfectly accurate grammatical definitions, and still more difficult for a pupil to understand them thoroughly; but difficulties are not surmounted by being evaded; and the clumsy, slipshod attempts at definition, with which most of the school grammars in current use abound, are worse than useless.

One of the first distinctions that a learner must get thoroughly familiar with is that between a substantive and an adjective,—between a word that can be the subject of a sentence, or be governed

by a verb or preposition, and a word that cannot. I have therefore, in the first instance, introduced the learner to a considerable number of the so-called *pronouns*, under the head of *adjectives*. These latter I have distributed into the three classes of Qualitative, Quantitative, and Demonstrative Adjectives. It is very perplexing to a beginner to have his notions of an adjective derived from the Qualitative class exclusively, and then to be left to deal with the rest as he best can. Indeed, many writers of grammars have perplexed themselves as much as their pupils, and have put such words as *all*, *many*, &c., and even the numerals, into the class of pronouns. It appears to me a most unfortunate misuse of terms, when, instead of keeping to the simple and exhaustive classification of *nouns* and *adjectives*, the latter are called *nouns adjective*. The Latin grammars offend most pertinaciously in this respect. The grammatical affinities of words are greatly obscured by this error. An adjective is not a *name*. Moreover, it will be seen from the classification of notions and their verbal representatives, which is given in the course of the present work, that the adjective and the verb are more closely related to each other, than the adjective and the noun, since they both express *attributive* notions.

The scheme of tenses which I have adopted agrees in its main features with the classification of all the best modern grammarians. It is simpler, more exact, and in every way better than such awkward, ambiguous, and unmeaning terms as *pluperfect*, *prior perfect*, *progressive forms* *first future*, *second future*, with which most English grammars abound.

The adverb is a part of speech which has suffered much ill usage at the hands of grammarians. Its domain has been very improperly restricted, and many words which are genuine adverbs in their relation to verbs, adjectives, and other adverbs, have been set down as mere conjunctions. In the classification which I have adopted, I have merely endeavoured to apply carefully the acknowledged truth, that a word which indicates any of the conditions of time, place, manner, degree, cause, or circumstance under which an attributive notion is connected with an object of thought, is an adverb. Some will perhaps demur at first to the truth of the statement that such words as *than*, *as*, *therefore*, &c. are adverbs. Before they finally reject it, however, they should examine and compare what is said in §§ 260, 264, 266, 267, 292,

408, with the examples of the analysis of compound and elliptical sentences. It is important to observe that in continuous speech *thoughts* may be connected with each other by the simple sequence, or juxtaposition of sentences, without the existence of any *formal* bond of connection. In this way demonstrative words of various kinds may *refer* the mind back to something previously mentioned, although there is no *structural* connection between the sentence in which they occur and the preceding sentence. The relative pronoun is rightly called a *connective* word, but the pronoun *he* carries the mind back to some *antecedent name*, quite as much as the *relative* does. Yet no grammarian would class *he* amongst the *connective* words. *Who* is a connective word not through its *relative* force, but through the *structural connection* which it establishes between two clauses. Through want of attention to this distinction many merely demonstrative adverbs have been set down by grammarians as conjunctions. Becker offends as much as any in this respect. Further remarks on this point will be found in §§ 408, &c. of the present work.

In treating of Conjunctions I have adopted the classification indicated by Becker, rejecting many of the details, which, for reasons indicated above, appeared to me to mar the whole scheme. In a note on § 286, enough has been said to justify the disuse of the stupid old names, *copulative conjunctions* and *disjunctive conjunctions*, the former of which involves an unmeaning tautology, while the latter is simply self-contradictory. The division into *co-ordinative* and *subordinative* conjunctions has at least the advantage of being based upon a well-established classification of compound sentences, of exhibiting structural distinctions which the old-fashioned division obliterates, and of presenting the only distinction which really has a *grammatical* import. It is one of the merits of the new Public School Latin Primer, that it adopts this simplified division of conjunctions. Let us hope that that venerable old impostor, the Disjunctive Conjunction, will soon be extant only in a fossil state. If its modern counterfeit, the Adversative Conjunction, shares the same fate, I shall be well satisfied.

The syntactical portion of the present work derives many of its leading features from the principles developed by Becker in his German Grammar. The publication of that work may well be regarded as an epoch in the history of grammatical science. Its

leading doctrines are incontrovertibly sound and philosophical, though the same unqualified praise is by no means to be bestowed on the details of their development. The latter abound in capricious distinctions and arbitrary generalizations.

In this edition I have introduced a classification of words based upon that of Becker, but with some important alterations. His treatment of *Relational* words appears to me to import into the subject considerations utterly foreign to *grammar*, and to make a number of very questionable metaphysical distinctions override the most obvious *grammatical affinities*. The whole question cannot be discussed here, but the more I examine the matter, the more decisively I reject a classification which throws together auxiliary verbs, articles, pronouns, numerals, prepositions, conjunctions, and adverbs, and treats them as relational words, denoting partly the relation of some notion to the speaker, and partly the relation of one notion to another, while verbs, substantives and adjectives, are (rightly enough) set down as words that express some notion. It is an utter mistake in grammar to make the collateral signification of a word override its *grammatical functions*. The declension and syntactical structure of *bonus* 'good,' and *meus* 'my,' show that the latter belongs (grammatically) to the same class of words as the former. To make the non-grammatical consideration that *meus* involves in its meaning a reference to the speaker, which *bonus* does not, the ground for assigning the former the class of *notional* words, and the latter to the class of *relational* words, is subversive of all sound principles of classification. It seems obvious enough too, that the *relation to the speaker*, which is involved in *meus*, is part of the *notion* expressed by the word.

Becker distinguishes three relations in which words stand to each other:—1. The Predicative; 2. The Attributive; 3. The Objective. About the first two of these there is no difficulty. In place of the third I have introduced two separate relations,—the *Objective Relation* and the *Adverbial Relation*. Practically this makes but little difference, for Becker subdivides Objects into Objects that *complete* the predicate (to which the term *object* is commonly applied in grammar), and objects that determine or individualize the *general* meaning of the verb or adjective, without completing it, with reference to which he uses the term *adverbial relation*. My objection to Becker's classification is

directed mainly to his endeavour to bring both these under the one head of *Object*. That term has such a very definite and intelligible sense in grammar, that it appears to me a most arbitrary and unnatural use of it, to say that the *place*, the *manner*, nay even the *cause* of an action, is an *object* of the action. I also object to the distinction that he draws by his use of the term *completing relation*. In such sentences as "He strikes the ball," "He runs across the meadow," the verb *strikes* expresses the action referred to at least as completely as the verb *runs*; and the phrase *across the meadow* completes the notion in the latter case, quite as much as *ball* does in the former. This consideration will become still more obvious when we consider that the original force of the accusative case was to denote *motion to an object*.

The mode in which I have treated the terms *predicate* and *copula* (§ 347) agrees with that of Dr. Kennedy in his Latin Grammar (§ 101), though it was not borrowed from him, as, at the time when my grammar first appeared, I knew Dr. Kennedy's Latin Grammar only by name, and was quite unaware of the mode in which he treats the subject. The omission of the verb *sum* as a copula has also the weighty sanction of Madvig (*Lat. Gr.*, § 209). It is also rejected by Mr. Roby (*Lat. Gr.*, § 143) and the authors of the *Public School Latin Primer*. The obstinate vitality of grammatical errors is something wonderful. Grammars of repute (both English and Latin) will be found in which the learner is taught that the predicate of a sentence may be a *verb*, an *adjective*, or another *substantive*, as though an adjective could by any possibility be the equivalent of a verb. One advantage that will follow from the adoption of the view here taken will be that we shall get rid of a difficulty, which, if not quietly ignored (as is often the case in systems of grammatical analysis), is sure to lead to an anomaly. If, in the sentence *He is rich*, *rich* is the predicate, and *is* the copula, why, in the sentence *He becomes rich*, should we not call *becomes* the copula? The notion of *becoming* has quite as good a right to be considered copulative as the notion of *being*. The difficulty is removed, and the anomaly obviated, when we regard neither *be* nor *become* as a copula, but treat them both as verbs of *incomplete predication* (see § 392). And now ensues another advantage from discarding Becker's use of the term *completion of the predicate*, as applied to the object of a transitive verb. We can apply it, or some equiva-