

**HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY (FIRST
DIVISION.); THE INTELLECT:
AN INTRODUCTION TO
PHILOSOPHY**

Published @ 2017 Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd

ISBN 9780649609307

Human Psychology (First Division.); The Intellect: An Introduction to Philosophy by E. Janes

Except for use in any review, the reproduction or utilisation of this work in whole or in part in any form by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including xerography, photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, is forbidden without the permission of the publisher, Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd, PO Box 1576 Collingwood, Victoria 3066 Australia.

All rights reserved.

Edited by Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd.
Cover @ 2017

This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form or binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

www.triestepublishing.com

E. JANES

**HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY (FIRST
DIVISION.); THE INTELLECT:
AN INTRODUCTION TO
PHILOSOPHY**

HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY.

(FIRST DIVISION.)

THE INTELLECT.

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.

By Rev. E. JAMES, A. M.

OAKLAND, CAL.,
W. B. HARDY,
1884.

Phil 5249.3.5

HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY
GIFT OF THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORICAL SOCIETY
JUN 10 1938

COPYRIGHT, 1884.

By E. J. ANES, Oakland, Cal.

PACIFIC PRESS,

Printers, Electrotypers, and Binders.
25th and Castro Sts., } 509 Commercial St.,
Oakland. } { San Francisco

PREFACE.

MY purpose in writing this book has been, to furnish something adapted to the use of ordinary college classes, and other young persons who may desire an introduction to the study of philosophy. I was led to see the need of such a book by actual experience in teaching. I found that the existing text-books were unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons.

Of the American books on this subject, nearly all were written a number of years ago, and are now somewhat out of date. Within twenty years some substantial progress has been made in psychology, and several important researches have appeared. Most of these text-books, moreover, have paid little or no attention to the German literature of the subject. Many contain mere sketches of the Intellect, giving the most space to the Emotions and the Will. Some are too large, difficult, and ill-arranged. Some are too abstruse in style and matter.

Some of the ablest text-books are too one-sided. For example, Prof. Bain's *Mental Science* is an able exposition of the Associational psychology, but gives no adequate knowledge of anything else.

In composing this book I have endeavored constantly to keep in mind the needs of students, and to avoid the above defects. In doing so I have had the advantage of testing large parts of it by actual experiment with young students of the subject, whose suggestions, sometimes unconscious, have been valuable to me at many points.

Attention is requested to the following features of the present work, as the objects at which I have aimed.

1. It is a small book, as all text-books should be; yet it contains, I believe, more matter strictly on the intellect than any other American text-book, except that of President Porter. Though small enough to be read through by a college class in one term, it is yet large enough to contain a fair introduction to the study of philosophy, and give the attentive stu-

PREFACE.

dent some idea of the literature of the subject. In striving to accomplish this, the two following features have become specially important.

2. Condensation and brevity have been aimed at, as far as consistent with clearness. Obscurity, prolixity, and unnecessary abstrusity are equally out of place in a text-book.

3. In treating those parts of the subject which require illustration by instances, I have given but a few in each case, selected from the best. A vast mass of such material has been accumulated in the easily accessible works of Carpenter, Maudsley, Ribot, Sully, Taine, etc. I deem it not worth while to reprint very many of these examples, or to require students to study them. The teacher can read to the class, with better effect, his own selection of them, and will find new material constantly in current literature.

4. The arrangement is progressive. It begins with the senses, after only the most necessary preliminaries, and ascends through Perception to the metaphysical questions involved in Psychology.

5. It quotes freely from the best authorities, and from those only. The "Dictate" from the lectures of Lotze, published after his death, have been very often made use of. Herbert Spencer is frequently quoted, though not so often with approval as Lotze. Bain has been constantly referred to, and his great merits acknowledged, but his errors, as I deem them, pointed out. Hamilton and Porter have, of course, been constantly in my hand. I owe much also to Drbal's "*empirische Psychologie*."

6. In the historical sketch an attempt has been made to cause each great philosopher described, to appear to the student, not as a mere bundle of doctrines, but as a personality, a man. A full account of their opinions would be often too abstruse and always too prolix for such a work, but much is gained if interest can be excited in the great names of philosophy.

A full and careful index has been added, showing the number of times each important authority has been quoted or cited.

If this book shall help to make the study of psychology and philosophy more attractive and more accessible to students or general readers, I shall feel rewarded for my labor.

It is my intention to prepare a brief treatise, similar in plan to the present one, on the second and third divisions of the general subject of Human Psychology, the Emotions, including Pleasure and Pain, and the Will.

E. J.

Oakland, Cal., June, 1884.

INTRODUCTION.

PHILOSOPHY is the science of first principles, that is, the principles which underlie all science and all knowledge. Though often derided by those who say, "Let us study phenomena, and leave abstractions to take care of themselves," philosophy is yet justified even by these ungrateful children, for they, too, are constrained, even unconsciously, to resort to metaphysical principles, and have each a philosophy of his own.

"The adepts in any of the special sciences never come to a full understanding of their own subjects of inquiry without encroaching on metaphysical ground, and even our physicists find themselves studying and teaching metaphysics unawares." (Bowen.) "We are compelled in every explanation of natural phenomena to leave the sphere of sense, and pass to things which are not objects of sense, and are defined by abstract conceptions." (Helmholtz.)

Indeed, the most characteristic conceptions of modern physical science, evolution, development, morphology, conservation of energy, correlation of forces, pangenesis—all are philosophical ideas, not subject to observation. "When the

doctrine of morphology was first explained to Schiller, he exclaimed, 'This is not an observation, but an idea.' "The fundamental ideas of modern science are as transcendental as any of the axioms of ancient philosophy." (Lewes.) "The highest generalizations of physical research bring us face to face with certain conceptions which are purely ideal and rational, that is, metaphysical ideas. Such are the ideas of substance, cause, force, life, order, proportion, law, purpose, unity, identity." (Cocker.)

Philosophy, then, is a necessity of the human mind; even those who assail it do so with its own weapons. "Aristotle long ago remarked that we are compelled to philosophize in order to prove that philosophy itself is illusory and vain." (Bowen.) Many modern scientific writers "are endeavoring to substitute for philosophy proper a species of speculative physical science, in which, however, careful analysis will always detect an unsuspected residuum of purely metaphysical principles." (Cocker.)

Philosophy may therefore be said to be a defence of fundamental truth. Errors in science, in ethics, in theology, in government, in legislation, are usually founded on abstract principles, assumed, perhaps unconsciously, without proof, or without the application of the criteria of truth. To detect and expose such errors requires us to recur to first principles, and establish them on firm and reasonable bases, to define those fundamental truths without which science and reasoning are alike impossible. The science of geometry depends on the abstract conception of space, arithmetic on number, law on right, ethics on duty, physics on cause, esthetics (the science of criticism) on beauty.

In English the word philosophy is often used in connection with the names of the sciences, as philosophy of geometry, philosophy of physics, of law, of education, of art, etc. This

does not imply that each of these subjects is a branch of philosophy, nor that each has within itself a different kind of philosophy, but denotes the abstract principles, the metaphysical ideas of each science or subject, as philosophically determined.

Philosophy may thus be defended as a delightful pursuit and exercise of the mind. As Molière's M. Jourdain was delighted to find that he had been talking prose all his life, so it is very pleasant for an acute mind to find that the questions and difficulties which naturally arise within itself have been experienced, discussed, and answered by other such minds in all the ages. To many minds the pursuit of knowledge is the highest of all pleasures; much more, then, is there attractiveness in the highest kind of knowledge, in pure science, where ultimate truth is sometimes difficult and disputed, but, when found and proved, embraces all being in its scope, and brings together all the sciences in a fascinating unity.

Philosophy, besides being necessary and valuable for its own sake, is useful:—

1. For training the mind to a philosophical temper, a candid love of truth, a calm confidence in itself. "There is a philosophic spirit which is far more valuable than any limited acquirements of philosophy; . . . a spirit which is quick to pursue whatever is within the reach of human intellect, but which is not less quick to discern the bounds that limit every human inquiry; . . . which knows how to distinguish what is just in itself from what is merely accredited by illustrious names; . . . adopting a truth which no one has sanctioned, and rejecting an error, of which all approve, with the same calmness as if no judgment were opposed to its own; . . . yet applauding gladly whatever is worthy of applause in a rival system, and venerating the very genius which it demonstrates to have erred." (Dr. T. Brown.)