

**GOMER; OR A BRIEF
ANALYSIS OF THE LANGUAGE
AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ANCIENT CYMRY**

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Gomer; Or a Brief Analysis of the Language and Knowledge of the Ancient Cymry by John Williams

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JOHN WILLIAMS

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A BRIEF ANALYSIS
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ANCIENT CYMRY.

"Lux in tenebris."

BY
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CONTENTS.

	PAGE
A Prefatory Letter addressed to his Countrymen by the Author	v
Introduction	1
CHAPTER I.	
Philosophy of the Mind, also called Metaphysics	19
CHAPTER II.	
On the Philosophy of Perception	24
CHAPTER III.	
On the Limitation of Thought to the Conditional	35
Summary	44
CHAPTER IV.	
On certain Prefixes of Compound Words in the Cymraeg or Welsh Language	45
CHAPTER V.	
Words connected with Existence, Intellect, and the Senses, as respects their Roots, Compounds, and Derivatives . .	78

	PAGE
CHAPTER VI.	
Of "Gwedd" and its Derivatives	119
CHAPTER VII.	
Time and Place	125
CHAPTER VIII.	
Quotations in Illustration of the Subject of the Inquiry	133
Conclusion	146
APPENDIX.	
A Letter from the Archdeacon of Cardigan respecting the ancient connection between Hellas and Great Britain	155
APPENDIX.—No. 2.	
Extracts from Archaeological Letters of the Archdeacon of Cardigan	190
APPENDIX.—No. 3.	
Extracts from an unpublished Archaeological Paper	198

A PREFATORY LETTER ADDRESSED TO HIS
COUNTRYMEN BY THE AUTHOR.

MY DEAR COUNTRYMEN,

I WAS from early life impressed with a deep conviction of the value of the Cymraeg as a key to the etymology of the Western languages of Europe both ancient and modern, and in a paper published in the transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh many years ago, had shown the close connection between the Cymraeg and Latin languages.

During the continuance of my etymological research, as I had to examine critically the languages, not only of Greece and Rome, but also of the Teutons and the Celts, and to investigate them by the light of their philosophy, history, and mythology, I had soon occasion to infer that a much greater and more accurate knowledge of things in general must have been possessed by those whose intellectual instruments they were, than modern literature would ascribe to them.

My opinion on this subject was given in the following terms, in a paper read before the same

Royal Society, more for the purpose of registering the time of its mature adoption, than of attaining any other object.

“I might here close my paper, were I not convinced that in some ancient languages we have an instrument both logical and philological constructed on the principles of an Eutopian terminology, and which may be reduced to a few intelligible keys or roots. We know from the *Cratylus* of Plato that the Pythagorean school held a similar doctrine, and taught that the word, as a general principle, was a picture of the idea to be represented; and even Aristotle himself, when taking advantage of the fineness of the Greek language, as such an instrument repeatedly hints, that he does not know how to account for the scientific accuracy of a common word, without supposing it to be an inheritance handed down through periods of darkness and barbarism from an antecedent period when the Arts and Sciences had been in a flourishing state. His words (*Metaphys.*, lib. xii., cap. 8,) are, ‘It is probable that, as every individual art and philosophy have been as far as possible discovered, and have again perished, these opinions have been preserved as remnants of such knowledge.’

“Thus also in his book, ‘*περι οὐρανου*,’ he repeats the same persuasion. ‘Even the name appears to have been handed down to the present age from those of old, who held on the subject the same opinion as I do, for not once or twice, but an infinite

number of times ought we to think that the same knowledge has reached mankind.'

We need not accept Aristotle's theory of alternate periods of high civilization and barbarism, but we must accept his testimony that the Greek vocables literally interpreted, often indicated philosophic truths which had become unknown to the people who still continued to use them.

At the close of the paper I wrote thus:—"As I feel it is presumptuous in me to say that I have partially found these keys, that secrets, never suspected by abler men and profounder scholars, have been discovered by me alone, that the very assumption of the possibility of such a discovery is offensive to the limited and self-satisfied scholar, and an object of suspicion to the most candid and judicious, I can only allege in my defence, that I have neither been rash nor hasty, and that nothing but the knowledge that the path I am treading must eventually, although perhaps after many deviations, lead to the demonstrable truth, could induce me to submit to the toils and difficulties of such an investigation. I must, therefore, bespeak the good will and forbearance of my readers, who will also be my judges, for they *must* approach the consideration of such a subject with their judgment clouded by prejudices, in its primary and not offensive meaning, and almost blocked up by foregone conclusions."

In Aristotle's own words, previous to entering on his metaphysical disquisitions—