

**THE RUDIMENTS OF THE ART OF
LOGIC: LITERALLY TRANSLATED
FROM THE TEXT OF ALDRICH,
WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES**

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The Rudiments of the Art of Logic: Literally Translated from the Text of Aldrich, with Explanatory Notes by Henry Aldrich

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HENRY ALDRICH

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A Part of

THE

RUDIMENTS

OF

THE ART OF LOGIC;

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SEVENTH EDITION.


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
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To





THE
RUDIMENTS OF LOGIC.



CHAP. I.

Of Simple Terms.

SECT. I. *The OPERATIONS of the mind are enumerated, defined, and considered metaphysically: apprehension, judgment, discourse. Apprehension is either complex or incomplex; judgment either affirmative or negative; the difference between judgment and complex apprehension is explained, and elucidated by an example: each of the operations of the mind is liable to some defect, to which a name is given; hence is deduced a definition of LOGIC.—SECT. II. The necessity of representing our ideas by some signs is shewn; hence the origin of WORDS: words are defined; they are of three different sorts, simple, complex, decomplex, corresponding to the operations of the mind: in giving the reasons for adopting these last three expressions, we are brought to consider every argument as resolvable into three PROPOSITIONS, and every proposition into three words, and thence we deduce the most important definitions of subject, predicate, and copula.—SECT. III. Categorematic words are de-*

Ms. A. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

*fin*ed, as also the syncategorematic and the mixt : what is meant by a verb, in logic, shewn : how to consider all grammatical verbs shewn : the LOGICAL NOUN is defined and divided.—SECT. IV. ABSTRACTION considered : the existence of an universal essence proved ; it is represented by predicables or universals.—SECT. V. UNIVERSALS or PREDICABLES proved to be only five in number, genus, difference, species, property, accident, each of which is defined : it is concluded, that genus is predicated of different species ; species of different individuals ; difference, property, and accident, both of different species and different individuals : it is concluded also, that genus is a logical whole, and species a metaphysical whole, and, consequently, that difference divides the genus and constitutes the species.—SECT. VI. GENUS is of two kinds, highest and subaltern ; SPECIES is either subaltern or lowest ; what is meant by cognate genera explained : concluded, that DIFFERENCE is of two kinds, specific and generic ; PROPERTY, likewise, is either specific or generic ; ACCIDENT is separable or inseparable.—SECT. VII. DIVISION, its definition, its analogy to distribution of the whole into its parts shewn ; hence are derived the rules for dividing properly.—SECT. VIII. DEFINITION is defined ; its different kinds shewn ; is either nominal, accidental, logical, or physical ; its rules are given and proved.

§ 1. OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE MIND.

THE operations of the mind are in all three:

1. *Simple apprehension*; 2. *Judgment*; 3. *Discourse*.

1. *Simple apprehension* is the bare intellectual conception of a thing, in some respects similar to sensitive perception; for as the *image* of a thing is in the eye, so is the idea in the mind: and it is either *incomplex* or *complex*.^a

Simple incomplex apprehension is that of one object, as, of a *pen*; or also of several, confusedly,^b as *pens, hands*, etc. *Simple complex apprehension* is that of several objects, but with a certain order and reference, as, of a *pen in the hand*.

2. *Judgment* is that by which the mind not only perceives two objects, but, as it were, sitting on a tribunal, expressly pronounces within itself, that they agree with or differ from each other.

^a It was formerly supposed, that, by simple apprehension, the idea of an object was imprinted on the mind, in the same manner as, by the faculty of vision, its image is reflected on the retina of the eye. Hence apprehension has also been sometimes termed *perception*.

^b Confusedly means taken without any order or grammatical reference to each other.

For judgment is either *affirmative*, which is also called *composition*; or *negative*, which is also called *division*.^c

Moreover, as well the particle *is*, which by affirming expresses agreement, as *is not*, which by denying expresses disagreement, is called *copula*: (just as grammar also has its *disjunctive conjunctions*;) and, by determining this copula, judgment differs from complex apprehension.

For instance; if a person shall have said that *an equilateral triangle is equiangular*, I can, by simple *incomplex* apprehension, understand what each separate word of this sentence signifies; but by *complex*, what the *whole* sentence means. Now, by the light of nature itself I know "that any two objects must either agree or not agree with each other," and therefore that they must be joined by one or other of the copulas; nevertheless I have not yet made a judgment, until I shall have determined this copula, that is to say, settled within myself that these two objects, *equilateral triangle*,

^c Affirmative judgment (which is also termed composition) is that which expresses the *agreement* of the two objects which were compared. Negative judgment, or division, expresses their mutual disagreement. *Huyshé's Treatise on Logic.*

and *equiangular triangle*, ought to be united by this copula *is*, and by the other, *is not*.^d

3. *Discourse*^e is the motion or progress of the mind from one judgment to another; which is also termed *ratiocination*; and is signified by an illative copula, such as *therefore*, or some other similar: for instance,

He who is out of the power of fortune is happy;
The wise man is out of the power of fortune;
Therefore, The wise man is happy.

To each of the operations is incident its own peculiar defect. To apprehension, *indistinctness*; to judgment, *falsity*; to discourse, *an erroneous mode of inferring*.

Which, when philosophers observed, and had devised proper remedies for them, they reduced their precepts into one body, and denominated the science of them *logic*, or *the art of reasoning*.

Logic, therefore, is "an instrumental art,"^f

^d It must be observed, that the verb *to be*, in the present tense of the indicative mood, alone constitutes the copula. *Huyshc.*

^e Discourse, or *reasoning*, has been frequently confounded with *reason*, which should be guarded against. *Huyshc.*

^f An *instrumental art* is an art which is conducive as means to some end. And the end or object of logic is to *guide* and *direct* the mind in the acquisition of knowledge.