

**PERSONALITY. THE BEGINNING  
AND END OF METAPHYSICS AND  
A NECESSARY ASSUMPTION  
ALL POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY**

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Personality. The Beginning and End of Metaphysics and a Necessary Assumption All Positive Philosophy by A. W. Momerie

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**PERSONALITY**

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# PERSONALITY

THE BEGINNING AND END OF METAPHYSICS

AND A

NECESSARY ASSUMPTION IN ALL  
POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY

BY THE

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## PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

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THE substance of the following pages was originally written as a thesis for my doctor's degree. It was the embodiment of thoughts which were uppermost in my mind, after some years of almost exclusive devotion to philosophical reading. Notwithstanding the favourable reception accorded to the first edition, I delayed the publication of a second, hoping that I might be able, as a friendly reviewer had suggested, to strengthen my position by enlargement. Various engagements have, however, kept me from securing enough time for this purpose; and as I find the book is being constantly called for, I thought it better that it should come out again in the same slight form, rather than be any



longer delayed. I have revised it with considerable care, and have re-written entirely a good many paragraphs. It was suggested by an appreciative critic that matters would be much simplified for the popular reader, if I divided the essay into sections; and this I have accordingly done.

One or two of my reviewers found fault with me for not having unriddled all the mysteries of life,—at least they said that I should have shown, not only that an ego did exist, but how it came into existence, and in what relation it stood towards the Absolute. Now, in a metaphysical system which is offered as a complete explanation of the universe, we perhaps have a right to demand that these two great difficulties should be solved. No metaphysician, however, not even Hegel, has yet succeeded in solving them. And as for myself, I never professed—I never had the slightest intention in the present essay of producing a system of metaphysics. I know, of course, that the time which reviewers have at their disposal is limited; but if, in the present instance, they could have managed to read as far as to the end of the title, they would have

seen that my aim was simply to point out how Positivists assumed—and could not but assume—the existence of a certain metaphysical reality, in which, however, they supposed themselves to disbelieve.

I have seen no attempt to refute my main contention, which is that the Positivists really assume what they professedly deny; otherwise I should of course have felt bound either to modify my own arguments, or else to answer those of my opponents. Englishmen generally are said to be endowed with the gift of never knowing when they are beaten. But English Positivists seem to have a yet more remarkable talent—that of never knowing when they are attacked. My little essay was published anonymously, and for that reason, as well as for its intrinsic demerits, might have appeared to be unworthy of an answer. But the late Professor Green's 'Introduction to Hume,' and Principal Caird's 'Philosophy of Religion,' have met with the same unsatisfactory fate. The Positivists, except on the supposition that their theories are mere moonshine, should have something to say. Why do

they not say it? Unless they soon set about defending themselves, we shall begin to think that they agree with us, not only in their metaphysical assumptions, but also in the estimate which they have formed as to the value of their own philosophy.

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