ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY; A STUDY OF ITS METHOD AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENT

Published @ 2017 Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd

ISBN 9780649178216

English philosophy; a study of its method and general development by Thomas M. Forsyth

Except for use in any review, the reproduction or utilisation of this work in whole or in part in any form by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including xerography, photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, is forbidden without the permission of the publisher, Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd, PO Box 1576 Collingwood, Victoria 3066 Australia.

All rights reserved.

Edited by Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd. Cover @ 2017

This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form or binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

www.triestepublishing.com

THOMAS M. FORSYTH

ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY; A STUDY OF ITS METHOD AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENT

Trieste

5 Moore

ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY

AGENTS

AMERICA	THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 64 & 66 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK
AUSTRALASIA .	OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 805 FLINDERS LANR. MELBOURNE
CANADA	THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA, LTD. ST. MARTIN'S HOUSE, 70 BOND STREET, TORONTO
INDIA	MACMILLAN & COMPANY, LTD. Macmillan Building, BOMBAY 309 Bow Bazaar Streht, Calcutta

ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY

A STUDY OF ITS METHOD AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENT

ВY

1

THOMAS M. FORSYTH, M.A., D.PHIL (EDIN.)

ASSISTANT AND LECTURER IN LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS



LONDON ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK 1910

B 1111 F775.

PREFACE

RL

A FEW words are necessary about the contents of this book. Its scope is sufficiently indicated by the qualification introduced in the sub-title. But the title itself perhaps calls for an explanation. It is used rather than any alternative, because what is commonly called the English method characterizes distinctively the philosophy of the English-speaking peoples, and because my subject is mainly the development of this method and the significance it has for the character of this philosophy. The headings of the chapters, again, mercly designate the various aspects of the subject or lines of the general development. Anything in the nature of a history of English philosophy would require the outline filled in, to an indefinite extent, under each of them. The whole is little more than a suggestion, which it is yet hoped may be of some service to the student of philosophy, and which future workers may in one way or another utilize.

It is impossible for me to state my obligations with any degree of fulness. The book is rather an outcome of my whole reading and thinking on philosophic questions; in which a great variety of influences have had a share. My chief debt of gratitude is to Professor A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, whose teaching in philosophy gave me my start on the road of its further study, and who has taken a very kindly and helpful interest in my efforts. Of other living writers, I owe most to such different thinkers as Professor G. F. Stout, Mr. F. H. Bradley, and Mr. S. H. Hodgson.

1596112

PREFACE

The principles which have formed the guiding lines of this Study can, in general, be referred to the work of one or other of these philosophers. To the writings of Mr. Hodgson I am indebted more particularly as regards the nature of philosophic method; to Mr. Bradley, in the general conception of knowledge and its relation to reality; and to Professor Stout, for the principle of the conative character of consciousness. A few other acknowledgments are made, on special points, in footnotes.

My quest of truth amidst the conflict of philosophic opinion has yielded me, as definite outcome, at least the conviction that these — the experiential method, the fundamental identity of experience and reality, and the relativity of knowledge generally to life or practice—are equally essential aspects of it, and that the way to further truth lies somehow in their union. Some such 'voyage of discovery ' as the present inquiry was a necessity for me before I could get a foothold for any more specialized investigation. This is my plea on behalf of what might otherwise seem, notwithstanding its generality, a somewhat ambitious enterprise.

A portion of the following treatise has already been published in the form of two articles in *Mind* (N.S., vols. xiii and xvi). The parts that deal more especially with the subject of Method were, in their original form, my Thesis for the Doctorate in Philosophy at Edinburgh. The rest is new; and the plan of the whole has been remodelled. It is incidental to the mode of treatment adopted that there should be a certain amount of redundancy: I have sought to minimize this as far as possible. The index of the authors treated of or cited, along with occasional cross-references given in the footnotes, will enable the reader to bring allied passages together.

St. ANDREWS, February, 1910.

vi

CONTENTS

PAGES

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTORY : THE SIGNIFICANCE OF METHOD

The development of philosophy essentially a development of method, 1. Examples from the general history of philosophy, 2. The significance of this, 3. Each particular development characterized by its own method, *ib*. Relation of such movements to one another, 4. Nature of the development of English philosophy, 5. The English philosophy distinctively the philosophy of experience, 6. Scope of the following inquiry, 7.

II. THE UNITY AND DIFFERENTIATION OF KNOWLEDGE - 8-21

Francis Bacon, 8. The fundamental principles of his philosophy, *ib.* Its design, 9. Its practical spirit, *ib.* This a characteristic feature of English philosophy, 10. Bacon's plea for recognition of the unity of knowledge, 11. His survey of the sciences, *ib.* The means of their advancement, 12. The need of universality, 13. Bacon's conception of philosophy, *ib.* His use of analogy, 15. Its import for the progress of knowledge, 16. Conception of a scrial order of the sciences, 17. Meaning of this, 18. The logical significance of historical priority, *ib.* Unity both the starting-point and the goal of differentiation, 20. Transition to the formulation of scientific method, 21.

III. THE TWOFOLD ASPECT OF METHOD - - 22-44

Bacon's philosophy his conception of the experiential method of knowledge, 22. Proper and improper generalization, 23.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

PAGES

The 'anticipation' and the 'interrogation' of nature, 25. Bacon's doctrine of 'idola,' 26. Its significance, *ib.* The principles of his method expressed in its details, 28. Bacon's undervaluation of hypothesis, 30. The importance of hypothesis throughout scientific inquiry, 31. The ideational character of knowledge, 33. Deduction the counterpart of induction, 34.

Thomas Hobbes, 35. His account of philosophy and its method, *ib*. Emphasis on the conceptual aspect of scientific procedure, 37. His view of concepts and inference, 38. Criticism of this view, 39. The inadequacy of an abstract method, 41. This exemplified in Hobbes's system, 42. The defect correlative to that of Bacon's method, 43. Identity in aim of Bacon and Hobbes, *ib*.

IV. EXPERIENCE THE BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE

45-81

The distinctively philosophic problem in Hobbes, 45. The nature and origin of knowledge, 46. John Locke, 48. The purpose of his inquiry, *ib.* The conception of philosophy presented by Hume, 50. Philosophy the foundation of the sciences, 51. The fundamental problem of knowledge that of its own character and import, 52.

All knowledge derived from experience, 53. Locke's conception of experience, 54. Ideas as passive objects of knowledge, 55. Distinction between material and process of knowledge, 56. Ambiguities in Locke's doctrine, 57. The underlying dualism of mind and matter, 58. The representational theory of knowledge, ib. Primary and secondary qualities, 59. Conception of a substrate of qualities, 60. Significance of Locke's doctrine, 61. Criticism, 62. Ideas at once contents and functions of knowledge, ib. Bishop Berkeley, 63. No material substrate of perceptible qualities, 64. Esse is percipi, ib. Ideas as real things, 65. The design of Berkeley's philosophy, 66. His distinction between mind and ideas, ib. Result of this antithesis, 68. Ideas as presentations and as arbitrary symbols, 69. Want of coherence in Berkeley's philosophy, ib. David Hume, 70. His criterion for the validity of interpretative concepts, ib. His account

viii