

**THE RECOGNITION  
POLICY OF THE UNITED  
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**JULIUS GOEBEL**

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THE RECOGNITION POLICY OF  
THE UNITED STATES

BY

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BY  
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TO THE  
AMERICAN

To

MY FATHER AND MOTHER





## PREFACE

It will always be a great problem for the student of international law to determine the mutual relationships of law and policy. In the past, political considerations have invariably been of preponderating importance, and since this is due to the nature of the international system there is no indication that the future will bring any material change. It should be the task of the constructive publicist to establish and perfect the legal precepts which the practice of states has produced to prevent the purely political considerations from maintaining unrestricted sway. This is best accomplished by first an objective analysis of international facts which may then be interpreted on the basis of subjective thought. It is this latter process which strikes me as being of pre-eminent importance; it has puzzled writers and jurists from the time of Grotius to the present day, and satisfactory methods or solutions have never been found. This is due in large measure to historical tradition. Grotius and his immediate successors sought on the basis of a law of nature a purely metaphysical interpretation of the facts of international existence, and the scheme of rights and obligations outlined by them has survived to the present day the most vigorous attacks of those who seek to demolish the natural law system.

Realizing the fact that these concepts, in whatever form they may appear, are always with us, I have sought in the succeeding pages to give them a definite but limited place in the philosophical interpretation of the significance of recognition. At the same time, I have tried not to forget that

the questions with which I am dealing and the principles here evolved bear some relation to the empiric world and that in their determination the historic facts on which they are conditioned cannot be overlooked.

This study will concern itself chiefly with the recognition of states and governments. I have given little or no consideration to the question of the recognition of belligerency because I conceive it to be a matter with but slight relation to the main problem. This is not only for theoretical but also for historical reasons.

The subject of this study was suggested to me by Professor Garner of the University of Illinois, who first stimulated my interest in international law and politics. To Professor John Bassett Moore, whose instruction I have enjoyed during the past year, I am deeply indebted for kindly advice and inspiring counsel. Professor W. A. Dunning has also given me invaluable suggestions and criticisms which I gratefully acknowledge. Finally I cannot fail to express my profound appreciation of the constant help and encouragement which has been rendered me by my father.

JULIUS GOEBEL, JR.

NEW YORK CITY, APRIL 22, 1915.

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