

**PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY,
NEW SERIES. - VOL. III**

Published @ 2017 Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd

ISBN 9780649681204

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series. - Vol. III by Aristotelian Society

Except for use in any review, the reproduction or utilisation of this work in whole or in part in any form by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including xerography, photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, is forbidden without the permission of the publisher, Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd, PO Box 1576 Collingwood, Victoria 3066 Australia.

All rights reserved.

Edited by Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd.
Cover @ 2017

This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form or binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

www.triestepublishing.com

ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY

**PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY,
NEW SERIES. - VOL. III**

PROCEEDINGS
OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

NEW SERIES.—VOL. III.

*Containing the Papers read before the Society during the
Twenty-Fourth Session, 1902-1903.*

PUBLISHED BY
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE,
14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON, W.C.,
AND 7, BROAD STREET, OXFORD.

1903.

Price Ten Shillings and Sixpence nett.

HARRISON AND SONS,
PRINTERS IN ORDINARY TO HIS MAJESTY,
ST. MARTIN'S LANE, W.C.

HARRISON AND SONS,
PRINTERS IN ORDINARY TO HIS MAJESTY,
ST. MARTIN'S LANE, W.C.

99570

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
I.—MR. BRADLEY'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT. BY G. F. STOUT	1
II.—"APPEARANCE AND REALITY": A REPLY TO MR. CARR. BY A. J. FINBERG	29
DISCUSSION—Criticism by H. W. CATT	42
III.—TIME, NECESSITY, LAW, FREEDOM, FINAL CAUSE, DESIGN IN NATURE. BY SHADWORTH H. HODGSON	47
IV.—EXPERIENCE AND EMPIRICISM. BY G. E. MOORE ...	80
V.—THE LOGIC OF PRAGMATISM. BY HENRY STURT	96
VI.—A RE-STATEMENT OF SOME FEATURES IN KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTALISM. BY G. DAVES HICKS	123
VII.—THE RELATION OF LOGIC TO PSYCHOLOGY, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE VIEWS OF DR. BOSANQUET. BY W. R. BOYCE GIBSON	166
DISCUSSION—Criticism by Bernard Bosanquet	183
VIII.—THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUB-CONSCIOUS. BY R. LATTA	187
<hr style="width: 20%; margin: 10px auto;"/>	
ABSTRACT OF MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION	209
REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE	211
FINANCIAL STATEMENT	213
RULES	214
LIST OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FOR THE TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION, 1903-1904	217

PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY,
1902-1903.

I.—MR. BRADLEY'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT.

By G. F. STOUT. *See talk, Monist V40*
614

Introductory.—It would, I presume, be generally admitted, that all predication has for ultimate subject something concrete. But it seems a gigantic paradox to maintain that there is only one thing which is concrete in the sense required. Now it is just this paradox which forms the most essential feature of Mr. Bradley's theory of judgment, and it is just this paradox which constitutes the indispensable basis and presupposition of his whole philosophy.

Phil &
V37
min
v

In examining his views I shall refer especially to the first, and in a less degree to the second, chapter of the *Logic*. Both these chapters contain assertions which he would not now defend. But I shall endeavour to confine my criticism chiefly to those essential points which he does and must abide by.

Definition of Concreteness.—With a view to clearness, I must here attempt to say what I mean, and what, I take it, is ordinarily meant by the term *concrete*. What is concrete is particular. But we cannot affirm that whatever is particular is concrete. The roundness of this or that orange, as it exists in the orange, is particular. But it is not concrete. It is not concrete, for the reason that its particularity is derivative. It is particularised not only for our knowledge, but in fact by its being a partial feature of the particular

orange. If we disregard what is involved in its existence in the particular orange, we immediately think of it an abstract universal which cannot exist without being particularised. On the contrary, the orange is ordinarily regarded as particular in its own right. Doubtless it stands in manifold relations to other particulars, and such relatedness essentially determines its special nature. But such relatedness is not generally supposed to give it particular existence. Both the orange and the table on which it lies are for the plain man particulars in their own right—in other words, they are both concretes. And it is only because they are both concretes that they can stand in that particular relation which we express or imply by saying “that the orange is lying on the table.” The mutual relatedness distinctive of concrete existence presupposes their particularity, and therefore cannot logically constitute it. Concreteness, then, is underived particularity. In order to show that anything is not concrete, it is not sufficient to show that its special nature is determined by relations to other things. It must be shown that it owes its *particularity* to such relations, and that they do not, on the contrary, presuppose its particularity. It must be shown that it is only particularised as an adjective of something else. What Bradley, Spinoza, and Hegel try to show is that everything is ultimately particularised only as an adjective of the absolute. There is for them only one concrete. On the other hand, Aristotle, Leibnitz, and Herbart agree with common sense in holding that there are a plurality of concretes. In this I follow them.

Ideas and Signs.—Mr. Bradley begins with the thesis that there cannot be “judgment proper without ideas,”* and he proceeds to affirm that all ideas are symbols or signs, and must be recognised as such by the person judging. If we enquire what is a symbol or sign, he provides us with a precise answer. A sign or symbol is “any fact that has a meaning, and meaning

* *Logic*, p. 2.

consists of a part of the content (original or acquired),* cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign." As Mr. Bradley now no longer admits the possibility of "floating ideas," we must, in spite of the note to page 4, add that the content of the sign is not only cut loose from its existence, but also "referred away to another real subject." The term "content" stands for the nature of anything as distinguished from its existence.

If we examine this definition closely, we soon see that however well it may apply to the special case of ideas, it is not applicable to other signs. It is not true that whenever we use a sign, the content of the sign is thought of as qualifying the thing signified. When a forget-me-not is regarded by me as a sign of faithfulness in love, I do not mentally qualify faithfulness in love as being blue, or having stamens and a corolla. Yet Mr. Bradley, when he wrote the *Logic*, regarded such cases as coming within the scope of his definition. I submit that they evidently fall outside it. It is clear that so far as the definition holds good at all, it holds good only of signs which owe their significance to their likeness to the thing signified. But even here there is a difficulty. In regarding a handful of wheat as a sample of a sackful, I undoubtedly regard the qualities of the wheat in my hand as also belonging to the wheat in the sack. But I do not, in any intelligible sense, mentally cut loose these qualities from their existence in the sample before me. If I did not recognise the qualities as existing in the sample, it could not represent for me the rest of the wheat. Finally, it is very hard to accept the statement that only the content of signs can be significant, and not also their existence. When an engine-driver sees a danger-signal on the line, the actual existence of the signal at the time has surely a meaning

* I cannot discover what this reservation means. I have consulted Mr. Bradley himself without result. He assures me, however, that it is of no importance.