

**ANALYTIC  
PSYCHOLOGY. IN TWO  
VOLUMES. VOL. I. [1896]**

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Analytic Psychology. In Two Volumes. Vol. I. [1896] by G. F. Stout

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VOLUMES. VOL. I. [1896]**



ANALYTIC  
PSYCHOLOGY

BY

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IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I.



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## PREFACE.

THE time is rapidly approaching when no one will think of writing a book on Psychology in general, any more than of writing a book on Mathematics in general. The subject may be approached from the point of view of Physiology, of Mental Pathology, of Ethnology, and of Psycho-physical Experiment. Each of these methods has its own data, and its own distinct and independent ways of collecting and estimating evidence. By the side of these special lines of investigation, the time-honoured procedure of such men as Hobbes, Spinoza, Herbart, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Bain, still holds its own, and has its distinctive value. Indeed, its value is immensely enhanced by the fact that it is not now the whole of Psychology, but only a fragment of it. It may now be fruitful, not only within its own limits, as it has been in the past, but also as a help to inquirers in other lines. This remains true and important, even though we suppose its helpfulness to lie in mere suggestiveness, though this view, in my opinion, involves a serious under-estimate of its significance. I should say that its utility to other branches of psychological investigation is comparable to the guidance which an inland explorer of a large island may receive from a chart of the coast. On the other hand, to be of any value at all, it must stand on its own basis, and use the evidence appropriate to it; though where it is in doubt and difficulty, it will look for verification or refutation to the independent results of other methods.

The present work, in the main, follows the lines of the traditional English method. Its aim is to bring systematic


order into the crowd of facts concerning our mental life revealed by analysis of ordinary experience. Psychology is the most empirical of the sciences; and of all the branches of Psychology what is commonly though inaccurately called the introspective is most immersed in matter-of-fact. Its function is to describe, analyse, and arrange. In this respect it is contrasted with a line of psychological inquiry which we have not yet referred to. What is called the Genetic or Synthetic Method, instead of attempting merely to ascertain and define the processes of the developed consciousness as we now find them, proposes to itself the task of tracing the evolution of mind from its lowest to its highest planes.

When I first planned the present work, it was my intention to follow the genetic order of treatment. But I found myself baffled in the attempt to do this without a preparatory analysis of the developed consciousness. Our knowledge of mental processes, as we can observe and infer them in our own ordinary experience, is essential as a clue to the nature of mental process at lower levels. I therefore found myself driven to pave the way for genetic treatment by a previous analytic investigation: and the result was the present work. It must therefore be regarded, even in respect to my own plan of procedure, as a fragment of a larger whole. This will explain certain omissions which might otherwise appear strange. I have passed by whatever appeared capable of more efficient treatment from a genetic point of view. Thus, I have reserved the psychological investigation of Space and Time, the stages in the development of Self-Consciousness and of Will, and similar questions. I may say that my strongest psychological interest lies in certain genetic questions, and especially in those on which ethnographic evidence can be brought to bear.



My first acknowledgment of indebtedness is to Dr. James Ward. Whatever there may be of value in my work is ultimately due to his teaching. The effect of this influence is quite as real where I disagree from him as where I agree. Bain, Sully, and James have always been present to my mind in writing, and I feel deeply indebted to all of them. In general, I may say that where I criticise an author it is evidence that I think very highly of his work. Professor Bain's two great books appear ever more valuable and suggestive the more they are studied. I believe that I have been much influenced by my earlier study of Herbart, and of his disciple Steinthal. I have also found Mr. F. H. Bradley's work, especially as contained in his *Principles of Logic*, extremely suggestive. Among older writers, I feel that I owe most to Spinoza and to the English line of Empirical Psychology, especially to Hobbes and Hume. Professor Mackenzie kindly read through my proofs, and made many suggestions which have been extremely useful to me. Lady Welby also helped me in a similar way. My brother, Mr. J. F. Stout, has rendered me great assistance in preparing for the press, and in compiling the Index.

Chapters viii., ix., x., and xi. in book ii. have already appeared as articles in the pages of *Mind*. They have in each instance been greatly expanded and altered, so that they may be considered as virtually new. The general Introduction is an expansion and modification of a paper printed in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* on "The Scope and Method of Psychology". The chapter on "Relative Suggestion" appeared in the *Proceedings* of the Society for 1895.



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