

**THE BALFOUR LECTURES ON
REALISM: DELIVERED IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
BY A. SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON**

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The Balfour Lectures on Realism: delivered in the University of Edinburgh by A. Seth Pringle-Pattison by G. F. Barbour

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G. F. BARBOUR

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The
Balfour Lectures on Realism

Philos
P957b

The Balfour Lectures on Realism

Delivered in the University of Edinburgh

BY

^{Andrew}
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EDITED, WITH A

Memoir of the Author

BY

G. F. BARBOUR

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P R E F A C E.

AMONG the writings of Professor Pringle-Pattison which never appeared in a permanent form during his lifetime the most important was the Third Series of Balfour Lectures. These were delivered early in 1891, six months before his transference from the Chair of Logic in the University of St Andrews to the corresponding Chair in Edinburgh. The history of the Balfour Lectureship, and some indications of the reasons which prevented Professor Seth, as he then was, from publishing these Lectures on Realism as the sequel to *Scottish Philosophy and Hegelianism and Personality*, will be found in Chapter IV. of the Memoir which forms the earlier part of the present volume. So they need not be set out at length here. But it is well to state in a sentence the reasons which have led to their publication now. They not only complete a series of Lectures the earlier instalments of which awakened keen interest at the date of their publication and for long after, but they fill a considerable gap in the record of Professor Pringle-Pattison's philosophical development, and show how he regarded the problems of Epistemology at the end of his first period as a teacher and writer. Although they have not before appeared in volume form, they were published in the *Philosophical Review*, under the editorship of Dr J. G. Schurman; and those responsible for

this volume desire to thank the present editor of the *Review*, and the authorities of Cornell University, by whom it is published, for their courtesy in allowing the Lectures to be reprinted here.

Although the Memoir is not a long one, the number of those who have helped in its preparation is very considerable. The contribution of those who have placed letters at my disposal will be estimated by the reader of the Memoir itself; but I wish to express my special indebtedness to Mr Norman Pringle-Pattison and other members of Professor Pringle-Pattison's family who have given the most generous assistance; to Mrs John MacCunn, Mr J. B. Capper and Mr R. P. Hardie for valuable information and other help; and to Mr William Menzies for the account of the St Andrews professorship which forms the greater part of Chapter V. I am also greatly indebted to Mrs Edgar Dugdale, who has given on behalf of the late Earl of Balfour's literary executors permission to make free use of the correspondence extending over many years between Lord Balfour and Professor Pringle-Pattison; and I would extend not less hearty thanks to Miss Haldane for similar permission to use letters to and from Viscount Haldane, and to Mrs de Glehn and Mr R. C. Bosanquet, who have kindly allowed me to include in Chapter XI. unpublished letters of great value from Mr F. H. Bradley and Professor Bernard Bosanquet respectively.

G. F. BARBOUR.

FINCASTLE, PERTSHIRE,
September 1933.

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