

**SYNTAX OF THE MOODS
AND TENSES OF THE
GREEK VERB. SEVENTH
EDITION. [BOSTON-1880]**

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OF
THE MOODS AND TENSES
OF
THE GREEK VERB.

BY

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SEVENTH EDITION, REVISED.

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PREFACE

TO THE FIFTH EDITION.

SINCE the publication of the second edition of this work in 1865, several changes of expression and many corrections have been made, which it is impossible to enumerate in full. In preparing the fourth edition in 1870, and the fifth edition in 1873, the work has been carefully revised; several sections and notes have been rewritten, and some notes have been added. The only changes which can affect references made to the earlier editions (besides those mentioned on page v.) will be found in § 10, 1, Remark; § 11, Note 7; § 18, 1, Note; § 19, Note 6; § 66, 2, Note 3; § 78, Note; and § 114, 2, Note: these have been added since the second edition was printed. Changes of expression and additions will be found in the Remark before § 12; § 18, 1; § 23, 2, Note 3; § 37, 1; § 45, Note 7 (*a*); § 69, 1; § 70, 1; § 86, Note 1 (*b*); § 88, Remark; and § 89, 2, Note 1 and Remark 1; not to mention others of less importance. The most important change made in the fifth edition will be found in the statement of the classification of conditional sentences (§ 48). This has been adopted to make clearer the position of the present and past "general suppositions" which have the subjunctive and optative in Greek (§ 51), as opposed to the present and past "particular suppositions" which have the simple indicative (§ 49, 1). This distinction of these two classes in protasis is a striking peculiarity of Greek syntax; most languages having a single form of expression for both particular and general conditions here, as the Greek has in other kinds of conditions. I cannot state too distinctly, that the chief peculiarity of my classi-

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fication of conditional sentences consists in treating present and past general conditions as closely allied to ordinary present and past conditions (being actually united with them in one class in most languages, and occasionally even in Greek), and as only remotely connected, at least in sense, with the externally similar forms of future conditions which have the subjunctive and optative. This relation is especially obvious when we see that *ἐάν ποιεῖ* as a general supposition is occasionally represented by *εἰ ποιεῖ*, whereas *ἐάν ποιεῖ* in a future condition is equivalent to *εἰ ποιήσει* in the indicative. I have explained this at greater length in the *Philologus*, Vol. XXVIII. pp. 741-745 (Göttingen, 1869), and in a paper read before the American Philological Association in July, 1873. The change in § 48 has made necessary slight changes of expression in § 12; § 13, 1; § 20; § 21, 1; § 49, 1; § 51; § 60; § 61, 1; and § 62. An index to the examples which have been added in the later editions is given on page 212.

HARVARD COLLEGE, September, 1873.

The last-mentioned paper, in which the change in the classification of conditional sentences made in the edition of 1873 is explained and the whole system is defended, may be found in the *Transactions of the American Philological Association* for 1873, and in the *Journal of Philology*, Vol. V., No. 10.

September, 1875.

P R E F A C E

TO THE SECOND EDITION.

IN the first edition of the present work, published in 1860, I attempted to give a plain and practical statement of the principles which govern the relations of the Greek Moods and Tenses. Although many of these principles were established beyond dispute, there were others (and these often the most elementary) upon which scholars had long held the most opposite opinions. Upon many of these latter points I presented new views, which seemed to me to explain the phenomena of the language more satisfactorily than any that had been advanced. The favorable opinion of scholars has confirmed my belief, that some such attempt as I have made was demanded by the rising standard of classical scholarship in this country, and has given me reason to hope that my labor has not been entirely a thankless one.

The progress in grammatical science in this century has been made step by step, like that in every other science; and so it must long continue to be. He who imagines that every important principle of Greek and Latin syntax is as well understood and as clearly defined as the rules for addition and multiplication in Arithmetic, has not yet begun to learn. It is no disparagement of even the highest scholars, therefore, to say that they have left much of the most important work to be done by their successors.

The vague notions so often expressed on the Greek Moods, even by scholars of otherwise high attainments, are in strange contrast with the accuracy demanded by scientific scholarship in other departments. If the study of language is to retain its present place (or indeed any prominent place) in the mental

discipline of youth, it must be conducted on strictly scientific principles, and above all with scientific *accuracy*. On no other ground can we defend the course of elementary grammatical training, which is the basis of all sound classical scholarship. An elementary grammar should be as short as the best scholar can make it, but it should be as accurate as a chapter in Geometry. To those who cannot appreciate the importance of accuracy in scholarship, or even distinguish it from pedantry, to those who cannot see the superiority of the Greek in this respect over Chinese or Choctaw, it is useless to speak; but surely no scholar can fail to see that an accurate knowledge of the uses of the Greek Verb, with its variety of forms, each expressing its peculiar shade of meaning, must be indispensable to one who would understand the marvellous power of the Greek language to express the nicest distinctions of thought.

One great cause of the obscurity which has prevailed on this subject is the tendency of so many scholars to treat Greek syntax metaphysically rather than by the light of common sense. Since Hermann's application of Kant's *Categories of Modality* to the Greek Moods, this metaphysical tendency has been conspicuous in German grammatical treatises, and has affected many of the grammars used in England and America more than is generally supposed. The result of this is seen not merely in the discovery of hidden meanings which no Greek writer ever dreamed of, but more especially in the invention of nice distinctions between similar or even precisely equivalent expressions. A new era was introduced by Madvig, who has earned the lasting gratitude of scholars by his efforts to restore Greek syntax to the dominion of common sense. Madvig is fully justified in boasting that he was the first to give full and correct statements on such elementary matters as the meaning of the Aorist Optative and Infinitive, and the construction of *ὄν* and *έσ* in *oratio obliqua*; although Professor Sophocles distinctly recognized the same principles in his Grammar, published later in the same year with Madvig's (1847). I can hardly express my great indebtedness to Madvig's *Syntax der griechischen Sprache*, and to his *Bemerkungen über einige Punkte der griechischen Wortfügungslehre* (in a supplement to the *Philologus*, Vol. II.). The works of this eminent scholar have aided

me not only by the material which they have afforded as a basis for the present work, but also by the valuable suggestions with which they abound.

Next to Madvig, I must acknowledge my obligations to Krüger's *Griechische Sprachlehre*, which has everywhere supplied me with important details and most excellent examples. I have been frequently indebted to the other grammarians, who need not be specially mentioned. Bäumlein's *Untersuchungen über die griechischen Modi* reached me after the printing of the first edition was begun. I have often been indebted to his valuable collection of examples, and have derived many hints from his special criticisms; I regret that I cannot agree with the general principles to which he refers the uses of each mood, especially as his criticisms of the prevailing German theories on this subject are most satisfactory and instructive. I am indebted to the personal advice and suggestions of my learned colleague, Professor Sophocles, in the preparation of both editions, for information which no books could have supplied.

I must acknowledge the following special obligations. The notes on the tenses of the Indicative in Chapter II. are based mainly on Krüger, § 53. The chapters on the Infinitive and Participle are derived chiefly from Madvig's *Syntax* (Chapters V. and VI.), and partly from Krüger, § 55, § 56. The note on the Future Optative after *ἔπος*, &c. (§ 26, Note 1) contains the substance of Madvig's *Bemerkungen*, pp. 27 - 29; and the account of the various constructions that follow verbs of *hindrance* and *prevention* (§ 95, 2 and 3) is based on the same work, pp. 47 - 66. The statement of the principles of indirect discourse (Chapter IV. Section IV.) was written in nearly its present form before Madvig's *Syntax* reached me; and I was strongly confirmed in the views there expressed, by finding that they agreed almost exactly with those of Madvig. I was anticipated by him in my statement of the occasional use of the Present Optative to represent the Imperfect, and in my quotation of ΔΕΜ. in Onet. I. 869, 12 to illustrate it. I am entirely indebted to him, however, for the statement of the important principle explained in § 74, 2.

It remains to state what new material the present work professes to offer to scholars. The most important and most

radical innovation upon the ordinary system will be found in the classification of conditional sentences (§ 48), with its development in the rules that follow. I have explained the grounds of this classification at some length in the *Proceedings of the American Academy*, Vol. VI. p. 363, and will therefore merely allude to them here. The great difficulty (or rather the impossibility) of defining the force of the Subjunctive in protasis as distinguished from the Present Indicative, has arisen from neglect of the distinction between *particular* and *general* suppositions. When this is recognized, the distinction between the Subjunctive and the Present Indicative is seen to be entirely one of time; whereas all the common distinctions based on *possibility, certainty, &c.* will apply only to select examples, which of course are easily found to illustrate them. In the first edition, I could not persuade myself to abandon the old doctrines so completely as to exclude the common distinction between the Subjunctive and the Optative in protasis, — that the former implies a “prospect of decision,” while the latter does not. Subsequent experience has convinced me that there is no more distinction between *ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιῇ* and *εἰ τοῦτο ποιοίη* than between the English *if he shall do this* and *if he should do this*; and I think every one must see that here there is no distinction but that of greater or less vividness of expression. The simple fact that both could be expressed by the Latin *si hoc faciat* is a strong support of this view.

The principles of conditional sentences being first settled, I have attempted to carry out the analogy between these and *conditional relative* sentences more completely. It seems to me that it is only by adopting the classification of conditional sentences which I have given, that the true nature of the analogous relative sentences can be made clear. (See § 60, § 61, § 62.) Upon a right classification of conditional sentences depends also the right understanding of the forms used to express a wish (§ 82, § 83).

The frequent use of the Subjunctive with *ἵνα, ὅπως, &c.*, after past tenses, instead of the Optative, of which I had never seen a satisfactory explanation, is here explained on the principle of *oratio obliqua*. (See § 44, 2; § 77, 2.) The construction of the Infinitive with verbs like *χρῆν* and *ἔδει*, forming