THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN STUART MILL

Published @ 2017 Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd

ISBN 9780649648153

The Metaphysics of John Stuart Mill by W. L. Courtney

Except for use in any review, the reproduction or utilisation of this work in whole or in part in any form by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including xerography, photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, is forbidden without the permission of the publisher, Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd, PO Box 1576 Collingwood, Victoria 3066 Australia.

All rights reserved.

Edited by Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd. Cover @ 2017

This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form or binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

www.triestepublishing.com



THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN STUART MILL

Trieste

THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN STUART MILL.

.

1

BY

W. L. COURTNEY, M.A.,

YELLOW OF NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD.

London:

0. K

C. KEGAN PAUL & Co., 1, PATERNOSTER SQUARE. 1879.

ŧ. 32 3 30 26-7-1897 [The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved.] -

PREFACE.

1

2

THIS book is an attempt to deal in somewhat cursory fashion with large metaphysical problems. Questions of Philosophy almost necessarily involve an abstruse mode of treatment, intricate details, and a technical phraseology, which make them difficult and repellent to the majority of the reading public; while the attempt to treat them in a simple and broad manner, without the use of a peculiar nomenclature, seems fore-doomed to ignore their complexity and arduousness. Whether it is possible to steer clear of either misfortune is, perhaps, doubtful : all that I have tried to do in the following pages is to avoid prolixity, and to set as clearly as I could before the reader the main issue between rival systems. Originality I cannot and do not claim.

PREFACE.

That Mr. Mill's logical and psychological speculations distinctly raise metaphysical questions is in itself a proof of the reality of Metaphysics. Every system must of necessity rest on the basis of some theory of "Consciousness," and "Consciousness" brings inevitably in its train metaphysical problems. Even a physiologist like Mr. George Henry Lewes finds, in his "Problems of Life and Mind," that the Positive Philosophy must seek to lay, as best it can, the Mctaphysical ghost, which is ever starting up with awkward persistence to confront experimental psychology and demonstrated materialism.

It only remains for me to acknowledge assistance received from one or two friends, especially Mr. F. H. Bradley, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. Most of all, however, I am indebted to Professor Green's Introduction to the Philosophy of Hume,—a work to which many of these pages owe any value they may contain.

OXFORD, November, 1878.

vi

CONTENTS.

52

- ----

۰.

З¥

	CHAP.	L-INTRODUCTORY		• PAG
	n	ILTHE ANTECEDENTS OF MILL. HUME		·. 1
ſ		IIITHE ANTECEDENTS OF MILL (continued).	. 2
ł	**	IVCONSCIOURNESS	× 0	. 4
122		VBODY AND MIND	• •	. 68
	••	VITHE FRIMARY QUALITIES OF MATTER		. 81
	35	VIL-CAUSATION, AND THE UNIFORMITY OF	NATURE	. 98
	,,	VIII,—MATHEMATICAL AXIOMS AND NECESSARY	TRUTHS	. 116
i.		IXGENERAL IDEAS	8	. 134
	**	XEPILOGUE	8 IS	. 148

 $\mathbf{\hat{e}}$


 $\hat{\chi}^{(i)}$


÷.

T

20

1





0F

r

ł

JOHN STUART MILL.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

The future of metaphysical speculation is the question which is more and more agitating the modern philosophic mind. Is it doomed to yield to the conquering inroads of "Science," is it, in Mr. Lewes' language "to be crushed into dust beneath the chariot wheels of modern thought?" Or is there yet a region into which Science has never come, into which it cannot come, because Scientific methods cannot be applied to the source and fountain-head of all method whatsoever? Such a question can only be approached when it has become clear with what sort of problems metaphysics deals: it cannot be summarily despatched by the assertion that every such problem, when "rationally stated," is capable of