# SYNTAX OF THE MOODS AND TENSES OF THE GREEK VERB

Published @ 2017 Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd

### ISBN 9780649717132

Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb by William W. Goodwin

Except for use in any review, the reproduction or utilisation of this work in whole or in part in any form by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including xerography, photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, is forbidden without the permission of the publisher, Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd, PO Box 1576 Collingwood, Victoria 3066 Australia.

All rights reserved.

Edited by Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd. Cover @ 2017

This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form or binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

www.triestepublishing.com

## **WILLIAM W. GOODWIN**

# SYNTAX OF THE MOODS AND TENSES OF THE GREEK VERB



# SYNTAX

OF

# THE MOODS AND TENSES

OF

# THE GREEK VERB.

BY

WILLIAM W. GOODWIN, Ph. D.,
ELIOT PROFESSOR OF GREEK LITERATURE IN HABVARD UNIVERSITY.

SIXTH EDITION, REVISED.

BOSTON: GINN BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS. 1875.

## PREFACE

## TO THE SECOND EDITION.

In the first edition of the present work, published in 1860, I attempted to give a plain and practical statement of the principles which govern the relations of the Greek Moods and Tenses. Although many of these principles were established beyond dispute, there were others (and these often the most elementary) upon which scholars had long held the most opposite opinions. Upon many of these latter points I presented new views, which seemed to me to explain the phenomena of the language more satisfactorily than any that had been advanced. The favorable opinion of scholars has confirmed my belief, that some such attempt as I have made was demanded by the rising standard of classical scholarship in this country, and has given me reason to hope that my labor has not been entirely a thankless one.

The progress in grammatical science in this century has been made step by step, like that in every other science; and so it must long continue to be. He who imagines that every important principle of Greek and Latin syntax is as well understood and as clearly defined as the rules for addition and multiplication in Arithmetic, has not yet begun to learn. It is no disparagement of even the highest scholars, therefore, to say that they have left much of the most important work to be lone by their successors.

The vague notions so often expressed on the Greek Moods, even by scholars of otherwise high attainments, are in strange contrast with the accuracy demanded by scientific scholarship in other departments. If the study of language is to retain it present place (or indeed any prominent place) in the ment

discipline of youth, it must be conducted on strictly scientific principles, and above all with scientific accuracy. On no other ground can we defend the course of elementary grammatical training, which is the basis of all sound classical scholarship. An elementary grammar should be as short as the best scholar can make it, but it should be as accurate as a chapter in Geometry. To those who cannot appreciate the importance of accuracy in scholarship, or even distinguish it from pedantry, to those who cannot see the superiority of the Greek in this respect over Chinese or Choctaw, it is useless to speak; but surely no scholar can fail to see that an accurate knowledge of the uses of the Greek Verb, with its variety of forms, each expressing its peculiar shade of meaning, must be indispensable to one who would understand the marvellous power of the Greek language to express the nicest distinctions of thought.

One great cause of the obscurity which has prevailed on this subject is the tendency of so many scholars to treat Greek syntax metaphysically rather than by the light of common sense. Since Hermann's application of Kant's Categories of Modality to the Greek Moods, this metaphysical tendency has been conspicuous in German grammatical treatises, and has affected many of the grammars used in England and America more than is generally supposed. The result of this is seen not merely in the discovery of hidden meanings which no Greek writer ever dreamed of, but more especially in the invention of nice distinctions between similar or even precisely equivalent expressions. A new era was introduced by Madvig, who has earned the lasting gratitude of scholars by his efforts to restore Greek syntax to the dominion of common sense. Madvig is fully justified in boasting that he was the first to give full and correct statements on such elementary matters as the meaning of the Aorist Optative and Infinitive, and the construction of 544 and be in oratio obliqua; although Professor Sophocles distinctly recognized the same principles in his Grammar, published later in the same year with Madvig's (1847). I can hardly express my great indebtedness to Madvig's Syntax der griechischen Sprache, and to his Bemerkungen über einige Puncte der griechischen Wortfügungslehre (in a supplement to the Philologus, Vol. II.). The works of this eminent scholar have aided

me not only by the material which they have afforded as a basis for the present work, but also by the valuable suggestions with which they abound.

Next to Madvig, I must acknowledge my obligations to Krüger's Grischische Sprachlehre, which has everywhere supplied me with important details and most excellent examples. I have been frequently indebted to the other grammarians, who need not be specially mentioned. Bäumlein's Untersuchungen über die grischischen Modi reached me after the printing of the first edition was begun. I have often been indebted to his valuable collection of examples, and have derived many hints from his special criticisms; I regret that I cannot agree with the general principles to which he refers the uses of each mood, especially as his criticisms of the prevailing German theories on this subject are most satisfactory and instructive. I am indebted to the personal advice and suggestions of my learned colleague, Professor Sophocles, in the preparation of both editions, for information which no books could have supplied.

I must acknowledge the following special obligations. The notes on the tenses of the Indicative in Chapter II. are based mainly on Kruger, § 53. The chapters on the Infinitive and Participle are derived chiefly from Madvig's Syntax (Chapters V. and VI.), and partly from Krüger, § 55, § 56. The note on the Future Optative after ones, &c. (§ 26, Note 1) contains the substance of Madvig's Bemerkungen, pp. 27 - 29; and the account of the various constructions that follow verbs of hindrance and prevention (§ 95, 2 and 3) is based on the same work, pp. 47 - 66. The statement of the principles of indirect discourse (Chapter IV. Section IV.) was written in nearly its present form before Madvig's Syntax reached me; and I was strongly confirmed in the views there expressed, by finding that they agreed almost exactly with those of Madvig. I was anticipated by him in my statement of the occasional use of the Present Optative to represent the Imperfect, and in my quotation of DEM. in Onet. L 869, 12 to illustrate it. I am entirely indebted to him, however, for the statement of the important principle explained in § 74, 2.

It remains to state what new material the present work professes to offer to scholars. The most important and most radical innovation upon the ordinary system will be found in the classification of conditional sentences (§ 48), with its development in the rules that follow. I have explained the grounds of this classification at some length in the Proceedings of the American Academy, Vol. VI. p. 363, and will therefore merely allude to them here. The great difficulty (or rather the impossibility) of defining the force of the Subjunctive in protasis as distinguished from the Present Indicative, has arisen from neglect of the distinction between particular and general suppositions. When this is recognized, the distinction between the Subjunctive and the Present Indicative is seen to be entirely one of time; whereas all the common distinctions based on possibility, certainty, &c. will apply only to select examples, which of course are easily found to illustrate them. In the first edition, I could not persuade myself to abandon the old doctrines so completely as to exclude the common distinction between the Subjunctive and the Optative in protasis, - that the former implies a "prospect of decision," while the latter does not. Subsequent experience has convinced me that there is no more distinction between έαν τούτο ποιή and εί τούτο ποιοίς than between the English if he shall do this and if he should do this; and I think every one must see that here there is no distinction but that of greater or less vividness of expression. The simple fact that both could be expressed by the Latin si hoc faciat is a strong support of this view.

The principles of conditional sentences being first settled, I have attempted to carry out the analogy between these and conditional relative sentences more completely. It seems to me that it is only by adopting the classification of conditional sentences which I have given, that the true nature of the analogous relative sentences can be made clear. (See § 60, § 61, § 62.) Upon a right classification of conditional sentences depends also the right understanding of the forms used to express a wish (§ 82, § 83).

The frequent use of the Subjunctive with Ira, 5res, &c., after past tenses, instead of the Optative, of which I had never seen a satisfactory explanation, is here explained on the principle of oratio obliqua. (See § 44, 2; § 77, 2.) The construction of the Infinitive with verbs like  $\chi \rho \hat{\eta} \nu$  and  $\delta \delta \omega_{i}$ , forming

an apodosis, is explained in the present edition on a new principle, which (it is hoped) will remove many of the difficulties which the old explanation did not reach. (See § 49, 2, Note 3 and Remarks.) In the first edition, the usual distinction between the constructions that follow ab  $\mu \dot{p}$  was adopted with hesitation, including Elmsley's punctuation, by which the second person of the Future in prohibitions with  $a\dot{p}$  is made interrogative. In this edition both constructions are explained more satisfactorily upon the same principle. (See § 89, 1 and 2, with Notes and Remarks.) It is hoped that the new statement of the force of the Perfect Infinitive; in § 18, 3, (a) and (b) of this edition, will meet the difficulties which that tense presents. The statement in the former edition was very defective.

It may seem strange to some that no general definitions of the Indicative, Subjunctive, and Optative are attempted in the first chapter. I have rather taken warning from the numerous unsuccessful attempts that have been made to include all the uses of these moods in comprehensive definitions, and have preferred merely to illustrate their various uses by simple examples at the outset, leaving the explanations to their proper place in the book. For one, I am not ashamed to admit that I cannot propose a definition comprehensive enough to include all the examples in § 1, § 2, or § 3, which shall still be limited enough to be called a definition.

Besides the special changes already mentioned, the work has been subjected to a thorough revision, so that in many parts the new edition might claim to be an entirely new work.\*

Notwithstanding the changes in the second edition, very few alterations have been made in numbering the paragraphs or notes. The following are the only changes (except a few emissions) which can affect references already made to the first edition: — § 18, 8 is subdivided into (a) and (b); § 18, 8, Rem. takes the place of § 18, 4, Note; § 24, Notes 1 and 2 are rearranged; § 37, Note 2 is omitted, and N. 8 is changed to N. 2; § 45, N. 2 is subdivided into (a) and (b); in § 49, 2, N. 3, the present divisions (c), (d), and (e) were included in (b); § 64, 1 and 2 are rearranged; in § 92, 2, Note 1 is changed to Remark; § 109, N. 9 was included in N. 8.

The following additions have been made in the second edition: — § 49, 2, N. 6 (b); § 50, 1, Rem. 2; § 52, 2, Rem.; § 53, N. 4; § 64, Rem. 2; § 65, 3, N. 2; § 65, 4; § 69, 6; § 71, Rem. 2; § 89, 2, Rem. 1 and 2; § 92, 2, N. 1; § 95, 3, Rem.; § 108, N. 4 (b); § 112, 1, Rem.; § 112, 2, Rem.; § 113, Rem. after N. 10. The following have been materially changed in subject or in substance in the second edition: — § 25, 1, N. 5 (b); § 41, N. 4; § 48, Rem.; Remarks 1 and 2 after § 49, 2, N. 8; § 82, Rem. 2; § 89, 2, Notes 1 and 2.

Especially, the collection of examples has been revised and greatly enlarged, with the object of illustrating every variety of each construction from as wide a range of classic authors as possible. An index to these examples (more than 2,300 in number) is added to this edition. This index includes those which are merely cited, as well as those actually quoted, many of the former being quite as important as the latter. In the new edition, the matter printed in the two larger types has been reduced, and made as concise as was consistent with accuracy, while that printed in the smallest type has been greatly increased. It should be understood that only the firstmentioned portion of the work is intended for use as a grammatical text-book, while the notes and remarks in the smallest type are intended only for reference: with this view, the latter are often extended to a greater length than would otherwise be justifiable.

The Dramatists are cited by Dindorf's lines, except the fragments, which follow the numbers in Nauck's edition; Plato, by the pages of Stephanus; and Demosthenes, by Reiske's pages and lines. In the Index to the Examples, however, the sections of Bekker's German editions of Demosthenes have been added in each case, to facilitate reference. Other citations will be easily understood.

CAMBRIDGE, June, 1865.