

**THE FOUNDATIONS  
OF  
ETHICS, PP. 1-218**

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The Foundations of Ethics, pp. 1-218 by John Edward Maude & William James

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**JOHN EDWARD MAUDE & WILLIAM JAMES**

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THE  
FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS

BY  
JOHN EDWARD MAUDE, M.A.

EDITED BY  
WILLIAM JAMES  
*Professor of Philosophy in Harvard College.*



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## CONTENTS.

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	PAGE.
EDITOR'S PREFACE, . . . . .	I

### CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION. To harmonize by distinguishing is the aim of this work, 10.

### CHAPTER II.

WHAT IS THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS? ETHICS IS NOT THE SCIENCE OF GOOD AND EVIL. Various definitions of Ethics, 16. Ethics is the science of that which merits praise or blame in character, 19. Not the science of the good and evil effects of actions, 20. The words good and bad are ambiguously used, 25. "Good" is what causes pleasure, "bad" what causes pain, 27. The study of causes of happiness has nothing to do with Ethics proper, 29.

### CHAPTER III.

WHAT IS THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS? ETHICS IS NOT THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT AND WRONG. The moral law, 33. The merit of an agent does not depend on the relation of his acts to this law, 36. Actions conformed to this law are *right*; they need not be meritorious, 37.

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## CHAPTER IV.

WHAT IS THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS? ETHICS IS NOT THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY. The word "moral," 39. It means conformable to good custom, 41.

## CHAPTER V.

ETHICS IS THE SCIENCE OF VIRTUE. Praise and blame are due to responsible—*i. e.* free—agents exclusively, 42.

## CHAPTER VI.

PLEASURE AND DESIRE. The *Summum Bonum*, 45. Is it pleasure? 46. Pleasures differ only in degree, not in kind, 49. Nevertheless, they can not be accurately compared, 54. Desire is always primarily for pleasure, not for things, 60. Desire is inversely proportional to actual pleasure, 65. Idea of pleasure awakens desire, 67. Things awaken desire through idea of pleasure associated with them, 71. Pleasant idea *versus* idea of pleasure, 73. Causes of pleasure can be compared by the reason, 77. The notion of *utilities* as a help to estimating the worth of things, 83. Unreasonable choices explained by greater power over desire of idea of immediate pleasure, 92. Conclusions, 95.

## CHAPTER VII.

IMPULSE. Reason's estimates often incongruent with desire, 99; —and with natural impulse, 101. Virtue consists in not acting until reason has decided which act is best, 107. Good impulse is not virtue, 110. Pursuit of pleasure not inconsistent with virtue, 120. The true sphere of "Ethics," 127.



## CHAPTER VIII.

IMPULSE. The necessitarian doctrine is inconsistent with the existence of virtue, 131. Virtue relates not to outward acts, 132 ;—but expends itself in strengthening certain ideas, 133 ;—those, namely, which reason selects, 136. Relations of virtue to effort, 138. Other causes than virtuous effort may make reasonable ideas strong enough to prevail, 146. The act which the ideas occasion is then not virtuous, 152. Virtue is inward effort, 154. We can not tell how much of it is present in any one's conduct, 156. Neither intent nor good consequences of conduct make it virtuous, 162. Unreasoning yielding to impulse is the only viciousness, 166. Virtue impossible in perfect beings, 168.

## CHAPTER IX.

THE OBJECT TO BE ATTAINED BY VIRTUE. The problem stated, 171. Self-interest as essential an end as benefiting others and obeying moral law, 175. The two selves, 179. "Selfishness" is really neglect of self-interest, 182. Struggle of intellect with sense, 186. Intellect knows the wider self, 193.

## CHAPTER X.

VICE. Vice is inaction, 196.

## CHAPTER XI.

THE TRANSITORINESS OF MORALITY ; AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A SCIENCE OF ETHICS. Virtue belongs to imperfect beings, 199. The effects, only, of actions, are subjects for exact knowledge, 201.

## CHAPTER XII.

CONCLUSIONS. Fertility of the distinction between virtuous, good, right, and moral, 202. Confusions of which intuitionists are guilty, 206 ;—of which empiricists are guilty, 212. The question whether "moral sense" be innate is insignificant for Ethics, 214. Virtue discriminated from moral sensibility, 216. Connection of Ethics with Religion, 220.

## EDITOR'S PREFACE.

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The Author of the following Treatise bequeathed it, some time before his death, to my care. It took no lengthy examination of the manuscript to assure me that not only in justice to poor Maude's memory, but in justice to philosophy, it was a contribution which ought to see the light. It is with great pleasure, therefore, that, thanks to the generosity of a few kinsmen and friends of the writer, I find myself able to introduce it to the public in the present form.

I will give no account of its purport here, for that would be only to repeat in substance the table of contents which precedes. I will only say of the *treatment* of the topics and theses there enumerated, that Maude's mind was as eminent for clearness in making distinctions, as it was for logical consistency in the use of them when made. I am sure that no one whose reading has made him familiar with that jumbling together of different questions and different points of view which constitutes most ethical discussion, can fail to be delighted from the outset with the sudden note of clearness which Maude's discriminations bring,