

**OUTLINES OF LOGIC: AN
ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF
TRENDELENBURG'S ELEMENTA
LOGICES ARISTOTELEAE**

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Outlines of Logic: An English Translation of Trendelenburg's *Elementa logices aristoteleae* by Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg Aristotle & R. Broughton

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AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Friedrich Adolf OF

TRENDELENBURG'S

ELEMENTA LOGICES ARISTOTELEÆ.

SECOND EDITION.

WITH ENGLISH NOTES,

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OUTLINES OF LOGIC.

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§ 1. WHEREVER we have truth or falsehood we must first have concepts compounded as if they were one; for it is with the compounding and dividing of concepts that truth and falsehood are concerned. Now simple names and verbs resemble the concept where no process of compounding or dividing has taken place, *e.g.*, the concepts *man* or *white*, where nothing is added to them. As yet we have neither truth nor falsehood, as we see by the fact that the concept *Goat-stag* has indeed a meaning, but as yet we cannot call the meaning either true or false, unless there be added the conception of Being or Not-being with or without a notion of time. He, therefore, judges rightly who thinks of that which is divided as divided, and of that which is in composition as compounded; and he falsely, who holds an opposite opinion to that which the facts of the case warrant.

§ 2. Every sentence is significant, but only that of which truth or falsehood can be predicated is declaratory. These cannot be predicated of all sentences, as, for instance, prayer takes the form of a sentence, but is neither true nor false. Dismissing, then, all other kinds as fitter subjects for investigation by Poetry or Rhetoric, our present study concerns itself with the Sentence declaratory.

§ 3. ¹Of terms when not used in combination, each signifies either Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, State, Action, or Passion. As examples

of Substance we may take *man, horse*; of Quantity, *of two cubits, of three cubits*; of Quality, *white, literary*; of Relation, *double, half, greater*; of Place, *in the Lyceum, in the market*; of Time, *yesterday, last year*; of Position, *is reclining, is sitting*; of State, *is shod, is armed*; of Action, *cuts, burns*; of Passion, *is being cut, is being burnt*.

§ 4. A declaratory sentence is (1) affirmative, (2) negative. Affirmation is declaration of a relation between this and that; Negation is a declaration of non-relation. The statements are true according as they agree with the facts of the case.

§ 5. The phrase Not-man is not a name; nor is there any existing name by which we can call it, for it is neither a sentence nor a negation. Let it pass as an Indefinite name, for it can be ranked equally well under either Being or Not-being. Every affirmation or negation will be made up of a name and a verb, or of an indefinite name and a verb: for without a verb there can be neither affirmation nor negation.

§ 6. Of terms, some are General, others Singular. By the former I mean such as can be predicated of many subjects; by the latter, such as cannot; e.g., we place *man* among general terms, *Kallias* among singular.

A Proposition is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. It may be either Universal, Particular, or Indefinite.³ By Universal, I mean a proposition which asserts something of all or none of its subject; by Particular, one which asserts or denies something of some or not all of the subject; by Indefinite, one which makes an assertion without specifying whether it is universal or particular, as were one to say that the same science deals with opposites, or that pleasure is not a good.

It is very evident that the universal proposition is superior to the particular; for of the two propositions, when we know the former, we are acquainted with the latter also, and know it virtually, or in potentiality. As, for instance, if a man knows that every triangle contains angles equal to two right-angles, he may be said to know that the angles of an isosceles triangle are equal to two right-angles, even if he does not know the isosceles as a form of triangle. On the other hand, a man acquainted with the particular proposition has no knowledge whatever of the universal, either virtually or actually. Again, the universal proposition is cognised by the reason, the particular by the senses.

§ 7. Every proposition is of predicability, either unqualified, necessary, or contingent.

§ 8. Of the whole number of existing terms, some are such as not to be truly predicable universally of any other terms; as, for instance, the terms Kleon, Kallias, and all other individual things and objects of sense-perception. On the other hand, these may have other things predicated of them; Kallias and Kleon, for instance, may be called men and animals. ^o Another class of terms are predicable of others, but cannot first have others predicated of them. A third class can be both predicated and predicated of, as, for instance, we may use *man* as a predicate of Kallias, and *animal* as a predicate of man. It is plain, then, that of existing terms some are naturally unfit for being used as predicates; for every object of sense-perception is of such a nature as to be predicable of nothing.

Genera can be predicated of their species, but species cannot conversely be predicated of their genera.

§ 9. It is impossible for the same thing to be at once predicable and not-predicable of the same thing, and in the same respect. This is the most certain of all principles, for it is impossible for any one to conceive the same thing both as being and as not-being. Accordingly, in all demonstrations this is appealed to as an ultimate principle.

* Truth must always, and in all points, be consistent with itself; for with truth all the facts of the case agree, but with falsehood they quickly disagree.

§ 10. Inasmuch as it is possible to deny predicability where it exists, and to affirm it where it does not exist, to deny it where it does not exist, and to affirm it where it does, and in the same way with respect to⁷ other times than the present it will be possible to deny every affirmation and to affirm every negation. Plainly, therefore, to every affirmation a negation stands opposed, and to every negation an affirmation. Let this, then, be called Contradiction, affirmation and negation being the opposites. By Opposition I mean the affirmation and negation of the predicability of the same predicate, of the same subject, but⁸ not in the same sense.

⁹ Contradiction is an opposition admitting of no intermediate. One part of a Contradiction is the affirmation of predicability, the other part is the negation of it.

In every case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject exist or no, one assertion will be false, and the other true. For in the case of the assertions, Socrates is ill, Socrates is not ill, if Socrates exist it is plain that one of them must be true or false. In like manner if he do not exist; for to say that he is ill when he does not exist is false, and to say that he is not ill true. So that of these propositions alone, which are opposed to each other as affirmative and negative, will it be a property that one must be either true or false (and the other the reverse).

§ 11. Of members of the same genus, those which stand most widely apart from one another we define as contraries.

Contradiction admits of no intermediate, contraries do admit of an intermediate.

§ 12. An affirmation and negation are opposed as contradictories, when the one enunciates a universal proposition, and the other maintains that the predicate cannot be universally affirmed of the given subject.

✓ *E.g.* (i.) All men are white.

Contradict.—Some men are not white.

✓ (ii.) No man is white.

Contradict.—Such and such a man is white.

Contrary opposition, on the other hand, consists in the affirmation and negation of the same universal proposition.

✓ *E.g.* (i.) All men are white. (ii.) All men are just.

Contraries.—No men are white. No men are just.

Such affirmation and negation, therefore, cannot both be true at the same time.

§ 13. Verbally, propositions may be opposed in four ways, thus :—

(i.) Universal affirmative to universal negative,
 (ii.) Universal affirmative to particular negative,
 (iii.) Particular affirmative to universal negative,
 × (iv.) Particular affirmative to particular negative ;
 but in reality in only three,¹⁰ for the particular affirmative is only verbally opposed to the particular negative. Of these Opposites, the universals, the affirmative to the negative, are contraries (*e.g.* the proposition, All science is good, to the proposition, No science is good), while the other two are contradictories.

§ 14. ¹¹ As we have seen, every proposition asserts predicability, either unqualified, necessary, or contingent; and of propositions in each mode, some are affirmative and some negative; and again, of affirmative and negative propositions, some are universal, others particular, others indefinite. The universal negative necessarily has its terms convertible: if no pleasure is a good, it follows that no good is a pleasure. The universal affirmative also is necessarily convertible, but only by becoming particular instead of universal: if all pleasure is a good, some good is a pleasure. Of the particular propositions the affirmative is necessarily convertible: if some pleasure is a good, then also some good will be a pleasure; but this is not the case with the negative, for it does not follow that if some animals are not men, therefore some men are not animals.