

# **THE FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGY**

Published @ 2017 Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd

ISBN 9780649107032

The foundations of strategy by H. M. Johnstone

Except for use in any review, the reproduction or utilisation of this work in whole or in part in any form by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including xerography, photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, is forbidden without the permission of the publisher, Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd, PO Box 1576 Collingwood, Victoria 3066 Australia.

All rights reserved.

Edited by Trieste Publishing Pty Ltd.  
Cover @ 2017

This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form or binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

[www.triestepublishing.com](http://www.triestepublishing.com)

**H. M. JOHNSTONE**

**THE FOUNDATIONS  
OF STRATEGY**



# "SPECIAL CAMPAIGN" SERIES

With *NUMEROUS MAPS* and *PLANS*.

*Crown 8vo. Cloth. 5/- net each*

- (1) **FROM SAARBRÜCK TO PARIS (Franco-German War, 1870)**  
By Lieut.-Colonel *SISSON PRATT*, late R.A.
- (2) **THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1877**  
By Major *F. MAURICE*, p.s.c.
- (3) **FREDERICKSBURG CAMPAIGN, 1862**  
By Major *G. W. REDWAY*
- (4) **THE CAMPAIGN OF MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859**  
By Colonel *HAROLD WYLLY*, C.B.
- (5) **THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN**  
By Lieut.-Colonel *SISSON PRATT*, late R.A.
- (6) **THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA, 1866**  
By Lieut.-Colonel *GLÜNICKE*
- (7) **THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN, 1813**  
By Colonel *F. N. MAUDE*, C.B.
- (8) **GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA**  
(The Wilderness Campaign)  
By Captain *VAUGHAN-SAWYER*
- (9) **THE JENA CAMPAIGN, 1806**  
By Colonel *F. N. MAUDE*, C.B.
- (10) **THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. Part 1**  
By Captain *F. R. SEDGWICK*
- (11) **THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1861-2**  
(Bull Run to Malvern Hill)  
By Major *G. W. REDWAY*
- (12) **THE ULM CAMPAIGN, 1805**  
By Colonel *F. N. MAUDE*, C.B.
- (13) **CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG, 1863**  
By Colonel *P. H. DALBIAC*, C.B.
- (14) **THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1862**  
(Cedar Run, Manassas and Sharpsburg)  
By *E. W. SHEPPARD*
- (15) **NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY, 1796-7 and 1800**  
By Lieut.-Colonel *R. G. BURTON*
- (16) **THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. Part 2. Dble Vol. 10/- net**  
(The Campaign in Manchuria, 1904-1905)  
By Captain *F. R. SEDGWICK*
- (17) **FROM BOULOGNE TO AUSTERLITZ**  
By Lieut.-Colonel *R. G. BURTON*
- (18) **MARLBOROUGH'S CAMPAIGNS**  
By Captain *F. W. O. MAYCOCK*, D.S.O.
- (19) **NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF RUSSIA**  
By Lieut.-Colonel *R. G. BURTON*
- (20) **THE FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGY**  
By Captain *H. M. JOHNSTONE*, R.E. Ret.
- (21) **THE INVASION OF FRANCE, 1814**  
By Captain *F. W. O. MAYCOCK*, D.S.O.

**LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN, LIMITED**

## PREFACE

FOUNDATIONS are broad and solid, but do not exhibit much detail. The art of Strategy, fully described, would be the work of a lifetime, and from its very bulk would be the despair of a publisher. But the foundations can be drawn on a reasonable expanse of paper.

The object of this preface is to justify the creation of the new technical phrase, "Full Strength," which is the corner-stone of this book. It is recognised everywhere that there is a master principle for success in war. Various efforts have been made to express this principle. "Surprise and the initiative are the secret of success in war" is one of these efforts. But this is not the real foundation, for you may gain all the advantage of surprise and still fail to produce as great a relative strength as was possible.

"Economy of force on secondary objects" is another effort. This is good as far as it goes, but it does not cover the ground. You may operate in so correct a manner with regard to detachments that you have everything available for the decisive collision, while omitting to take measures that would prevent the enemy having a similar totality of available strength.

"Preponderance of force at a chosen place at the right time" is another effort. This goes too far. To

have preponderance is pleasant, but it may be impossible, and there still remains a best thing to be done. The best thing is to have as much as you can for yourself, and as little as you can for the enemy, even if actual preponderance of numbers is impossible.

Strength and force are, it is recognised, far from being a mere matter of numbers. If training, discipline and organisation are equal, there still remains the paramount matter of *moral*.

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
DEFINITIONS . . . . .	1
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	7
PART I	
CHAPTER	
I. OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE . . . . .	15
II. BASE OF OPERATIONS AND LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS	26
III. "FULL STRENGTH" . . . . .	35
IV. SEIZURE AND RETENTION OF THE INITIATIVE . . . . .	42
V. INTELLIGENCE . . . . .	50
VI. MOBILITY . . . . .	57
VII. IMPORTANCE OF ORGANISATION AND VALUE OF NUMBERS . . . . .	63
VIII. TRAINING—ITS INFLUENCE ON STRATEGY . . . . .	71
IX. DISCIPLINE . . . . .	78
X. PHYSICAL FEATURES OF A THEATRE OF WAR . . . . .	85
XI. SELECTION OF OBJECTIVE . . . . .	98
XII. MORAL FACTORS IN WAR . . . . .	106
XIII. POLITICS . . . . .	113
XIV. THE INFLUENCE OF FORTRESSES . . . . .	118



PART II	
CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE OPENING OF A CAMPAIGN . . . . .	129
II. STRATEGICAL FRONTAL ATTACK OF A SINGLE ENEMY . . . . .	141
III. STRATEGICAL ATTACK OF TWO OR MORE ENEMIES	152
IV. TURNING A FLANK . . . . .	178
V. PLACING AN ARMY ON THE ENEMY'S COMMUNICA- TIONS . . . . .	188
VI. SEA POWER . . . . .	195
INDEX . . . . .	207

### MAPS

- I. SPAIN
- II. NORTH ITALY
- III. SOUTH GERMANY
- IV. NORTH-EAST FRANCE
- V. VIRGINIA
- VI. WATERLOO CAMPAIGN
- VII. BOHEMIA
- VIII. TURKEY AND BULGARIA
- IX. SOUTH AFRICA
- X. MANCHURIA

## DEFINITIONS

**STRATEGY** deals with movements and the taking up of positions of an army or armies, or parts of an army, up to the time when the next movements will bring about the collision.

**GRAND TACTICS.**—Those “next movements” of the units of the army.

**FIGHTING TACTICS** includes the methods which a unit employs when it has had its task assigned to it, and has come to grips with the enemy. Skirmishing, individual taking of cover, control of fire, advancing by rushes, crawling, covering fire, the bayonet charge, entrenching under fire—all such are a part of fighting tactics.

**MINOR TACTICS.**—The activities of a unit through all its movements and stationings in a campaign. Security against surprise, patrolling, scouting, marching in its details—all such belong to minor tactics.

**INITIATIVE** in strategy and grand tactics. The condition of having the lead with respect to the enemy, of being able to compel him to conform to one's own movements, and to confine him to parrying one's blows.

**BASE OF OPERATIONS.**—The place, or the sum of the places, from which an army in the field obtains, or can obtain, its necessary supplies of all kinds and its reinforcements. It is common to talk of ultimate base,

intermediate base, advanced base, temporary base ; these adjectives explain themselves.

**LINE OF OPERATIONS AND OF COMMUNICATIONS.**—These are often identical. The line of operations is the route, or the routes with the country between them, by which the army has advanced from its base to its present positions. The line of communications is the route or routes by which the army is at the moment linked to its base. A belligerent may assume single, double, triple, etc., lines of operations. The lines are double, triple, etc., when the total forces are divided into two, three or more armies which have their own distinct lines of communication and of retreat, to which they are at the moment compelled to adhere. That is, the mere dividing up into two or more armies does not of itself constitute multiplicity of lines ; it may only be for convenience of organisation.

**THEATRE OF WAR.**—The whole country between the bases of the belligerents.

**MOBILISATION.**—The raising of units to war strength by elimination of unfit and by completion of staffs, numbers, arms, equipments, ammunition, stores and transport.

**CONCENTRATION.**—The assembly of units at pre-arranged points for the purpose of constituting an army or armies.

**STRATEGICAL DEPLOYMENT.**—The constitution of a strategical front or fronts after the concentration.

**FORMING FRONT TO A FLANK.**—An army is so formed when its strategical or its tactical front is parallel to its line of communications, or approximately so.

**TURNING A FLANK.**—An operation intended to carry